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ABSTRACT 
WHERE IS THE ANCHOR NOW? A POLIHEURISTIC ANALYSIS OF TURKISH 
FOREIGN POLICY IN THE AKP PERIOD 
Sula, İsmail Erkam 
MA, Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof Serdar Ş. Güner 
September 2011 
 
This thesis analyzes Turkish foreign policy in the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi- Justice and Development Party) era. It summarizes the post-Cold War 
Turkish foreign policy literature and proposes a formal model of the AKP 
leaders’ decision-making process. The thesis asks one methodological and one 
empirical question. The methodological question aims at proposing a formal 
and holistic model integrating multi-level and multi-dimensional variables to 
explain the shifting foreign policy orientations of Turkey in the post-Cold War 
era. The application of Poliheuristic (PH) decision-making Theory is proposed 
as an answer to this question. The empirical question aims at explaining the 
major factors that determined the foreign policy orientation and re-
orientation of Turkey in the AKP period. The thesis argues that, among others, 
the prospect of EU membership; the impact of Ahmet Davutoğlu and his 
arguments on Turkey’s “strategic depth”; the domestic political conditions of 
the period; and the political background of the AKP have been the major 
determinants of these shifting foreign policy orientations. 
Keywords: Formal modeling, Turkish foreign policy, Decision-Making, 
Poliheuristic Theory, the AKP 
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ÖZET 
Çapa Şimdi Nerede? AK Parti dönemi Türk Dış Politikasının Polihöristik Analizi 
Sula, İsmail Erkam 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Serdar Ş. Güner 
Eylül 2011 
 
Bu Tez AK Parti dönemi Türk dış politikasını inclemektedir. Soğuk savaş sonrası 
Türk dış politikası literatürünü özetler ve AK Parti liderlerinin karar alma 
sürecine dair bir formel model önerir. Bir yöntemsel bir de ampirik soru 
sormaktadır. Yöntemsel  soru Turkiye’ nin soğuk savaş sonrası dönemde 
değişen dış politika yönelimlerini açıklayabilecek çok-düzeyli ve çok-boyutlu 
değişkenleri entegre eden formel ve bütünsel bir model önermeyi amaçlar. 
Yöntemsel soruyu Polihöristik Karar Alma Kuramı’ nı uygulayarak cevaplar. 
Ampirik soru ise AK Parti dönemi Türk dış politikasındaki yönelim değişiklerini 
belirleyen temel etmenleri açıklamaya çalışır. Tez, diğer birtakım etmenlerin 
yanısıra, Türkiye’ nin AB üyeliği beklentisinin, Davutoğlunun stratejik derinlik 
konusundaki görüşlerinin, dönemin iç politika koşullarının ve AK Parti’ nin 
siyasi arkaplanının değişen dış politika yönelimlerini etkileyen temel etmenler 
olduğunu öne sürer. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Formel modelleme, Türk dış politikcası, Karar alma süreci, 
Polihöristik kuram,  AK Parti  
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Foreign policy-making is a fundamental component of state behavior in the 
international arena. Understanding the dynamics behind foreign policy-
making processes of states entails a holistic approach that captures the 
interactive relationship between domestic, state and international level 
variables. However, integrating these variables in a single study is a 
challenging task. When Turkey’s post-Cold War foreign policy is considered, 
this task becomes even more challenging because of two main reasons. First, 
Turkey’s foreign policy orientations display changing patterns and trends 
depending on the ideological and political profiles of the ruling elite. Second, 
most of the major international events and structural changes of the Post-
Cold War era including the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the two Gulf wars, the 
Arab-Israeli conflicts, and the rising tensions between Islam and the West 
occurred in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood. These circumstances have 
made it difficult for Turkey to adopt a unidirectional approach to foreign 
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policy. Capturing these changing patterns requires a multi-level and multi-
dimensional framework. However, most of the studies on Turkish foreign 
policy (TFP) remained descriptive without necessarily providing a holistic 
approach. The descriptive nature of the large TFP literature resulted in the 
introduction of a complex set of variables making it difficult to capture the 
main dynamics that explain why a particular foreign policy orientation is 
preferred over other possible alternatives. This study demonstrates that an 
application of the poliheuristic (PH) decision-making theory generates a 
concrete, simple and organized explanation of TFP in the 2000s. 
The literature on TFP contends that Turkey has followed an “active” 
foreign policy throughout the post-Cold War era (see Çelik, 1999; Hale, 2000; 
Makovsky and Sayari, 2000; Oran, 2001; Kut, 2001; Rubin, 2001; Robins, 2003; 
Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; Martin and Keridis, 2003; Murinson, 2006; 
Davutoğlu 2009; and Güner 2011 among others). Especially with the AKP’s 
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi- the Justice and Development Party) accession to 
government in 2002, the previous foreign policy activism gained momentum. 
A significant shift in traditional Turkish foreign policy orientation is observed 
after the AKP founded the majority government in March 2003 (the 59th 
government of the Turkish National Assembly)1. The AKP policy-makers 
supported a new foreign policy orientation that emphasized Turkey’s EU 
                                                     
1
 The first AKP government was founded after November 2002 election by Abdullah Gül. The 
government served for five months, until March 2003, when Erdoğan was elected as a 
Member of Parliament and founded the 59th government. The foreign policy orientations of 
the first and second AKP governments are assumed to be identical in the thesis.  
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accession process and active involvement in its immediate neighborhood. 
Although these components were also observed in TFP of the 1990s, TFP of 
the 2000s represents a significant divergence from the activism of the 
previous decade. Whereas Turkey followed a “confrontational” and 
“security/defense” oriented foreign policy activism in 1990s, it followed a 
“peaceful” and “soft power” oriented one in the 2000s.  
The AKP’s foreign policy orientation is studied in two periods (Öniş, 
2009; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2009). It is argued that the AKP government pursued a 
new wave of activism in the first period (2003-2005) by emphasizing Turkey’s 
commitment to EU membership. However, Turkey-EU relations fell into a 
stalemate when the negotiations for full membership started in October 2005. 
This stalemate decreased the AKP leaders’ enthusiasm for EU membership. 
Thus, in the second period (post-2005) the heavy emphasis on Turkey-EU 
relations was replaced by an emphasis on Turkey’s “pivotal role” in its 
immediate neighborhood. 
This thesis aims to understand the underlying dynamics in the AKP’s 
foreign policy-making process. Accordingly, it tries to answer two interrelated 
questions, one methodological and one empirical. The methodological 
question is the following: “How is it possible to propose a formal and holistic 
model integrating multi-level and multi-dimensional variables to explain the 
shifting foreign policy orientations of Turkey in the post-Cold War era?” 
Utilizing the PH decision theory, the thesis provides a formal model that 
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integrates domestic level variables (such as election results, the domestic 
political and economic conditions, and the leaders’ domestic politics 
considerations), individual level variables (such as leaders’ foreign policy 
visions and their political background) and international level variables (such 
as the role of Turkey-EU relations and the impact of major international 
developments). The model serves as an abstraction of the foreign policy 
decision-making process in the AKP era. It conceptualizes the foreign policy 
orientation alternatives faced by the then AKP leaders’ (R.Tayyip Erdoğan, 
Abdullah Gül2, Ahmet Davutoğlu) and evaluates those alternatives across 
different dimensions (including political, economic, military/strategic and 
cultural/ideational dimensions). In addition, the information given in the post-
Cold War TFP literature is organized in line with AKP leaders’ expressions 
(selected from speeches given throughout 2003) of their foreign policy vision. 
While answering the methodological question the thesis asks an 
empirical one as well: “What are the major factors that determined TFP 
orientation and re-orientation during the AKP period?” It argues that the 
prospect of EU membership; the impact of Davutoğlu (the chief foreign policy 
advisor of the 59th government) and his arguments on Turkey’s ‘strategic 
depth’; the domestic political conditions of the period; and the political 
background (the National Vision tradition- Milli Görüş Hareketi) of AKP have 
                                                     
2
 Abdullah Gül, who was one of the founders of the AKP, was elected as the 11th (and 
current) President of the Republic of Turkey in August 28
th
, 2007. He cannot be regarded as 
an AKP Leader due to the legal impartiality of his current position. 
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been the major determinants of AKP’s foreign policy decisions. The empirical 
question is divided into three sub-questions: First, why did the AKP 
government follow an enthusiastic EU direction after assuming the 
government in 2002 given the Islamic roots and the anti-EU stance of their 
political background (the National Vision tradition)? Second, why did the AKP 
leaders decide to diverge from the foreign policy orientation of the 1990s by 
leaving the confrontational and military based orientation towards a more 
“soft-power” oriented one? Third, why did the AKP government shift the 
foreign policy axis of the country by leaving the heavy emphasis on EU after 
starting the accession negotiations in 2005? 
The thesis is composed of three main chapters. Chapter 2 introduces the 
theoretical and methodological framework of the thesis. It exposes the roots 
of the PH decision-making theory, its main authors, and the main cases that 
the theory is applied. It also lists the basic steps in building a PH decision-
making model and builds a sample PH decision matrix. 
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on TFP in the post-Cold War era while 
comparing the foreign policy activism in the AKP period with the activism of 
1990s. It summarizes the explanations provided by the literature on the 
relationship between Turkey’s EU membership perspective and its foreign 
policy.   
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Chapter 4 presents the formal model. It builds a PH model to analyze 
AKP’s decision to follow a new foreign policy orientation after assuming the 
government in 2003 by following the basic steps described in chapter 2 and in 
line with the literature on TFP in the AKP period given in chapter 3. The 
chapter also organizes the information given by the literature in line with AKP 
leaders’ expressions of their own foreign policy vision. The chapter ends with 
a discussion section where it interprets the findings. Finally, the conclusion 
(Chapter 5) summarizes the main arguments of the thesis, discusses the 
limitations of the methodology, and shows directions for further research.    
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CHAPTER II: 
 
 
POLIHEURISTIC DECISION-MAKING THEORY 
  
 
 
This chapter introduces the theoretical framework of the thesis and serves as 
a transition towards the main argument. The thesis utilizes the PH Decision-
Making model introduced by Alex Mintz to the foreign policy analysis (FPA) 
literature. It is a relatively new framework compared to the other decision-
making models including cybernetics model, expected utility model, and 
bureaucratic politics model. The theory provided fruitful results with more 
than forty scholarly articles published in leading journals of the political 
science and international relations discipline.  
The PH decision model is chosen because it can deal with both domestic 
and international level variables. The variables range from domestic ones 
(such as the domestic economic and political conditions, election results, and 
the leaders’ political background), leaders’ foreign policy vision (the ‘grand 
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strategy’ in leaders’ mind to achieve a central regional power status for 
Turkey in the region) to international variables (such as the role of the EU ).  
The chapter is composed of two main parts. First, it gives a brief 
overview of the FPA literature showing the roots and basics of the PH theory. 
Additionally, it lists the main figures in the PH theory literature, applications of 
the theory and presents its core principles. The second part explains how to 
build a PH model and exposes the basic steps in PH modeling and analysis. 
The conclusion summarizes the basic principles of the PH theory. 
 
 
2.1. Understanding the Roots and Basics of the Poliheuristic Theory 
 
2.1.1. A Brief overview of the FPA literature: 
 
FPA has been systematically studied as a part of the social sciences literature 
since the end of the Second World War. In the early 1950s, most of the 
studies were based on system-level explanations without necessarily referring 
to the cognitive, psychological and social factors that exist in the decision- 
making processes of human beings. They explained major developments in IR 
by keeping their explanatory mechanism as parsimonious as possible; thus, 
refrained from adding new variables to their explanations. The main aim of 
these studies was to develop testable generalizations of behavior and improve 
the predictability of future outcomes in an environment that contains a 
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significant possibility of a ‘nuclear war’. Following this aim, scholars like James 
Rosenau (1966), Harold and Margaret Sprout (1956; 1957; 1965), Richard 
Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin (1954; 1963) have set up the roots of 
the field. Particularly, Snyder et al. (1954) have argued that rather than just 
focusing on external factors, foreign policy analysts should be aware of the 
“dual-aspect.” By referring to the dual aspect, they emphasized that the 
foreign policy analyst should also examine the domestic-level so as to see the 
impact of domestic factors that impinge upon the decision-making process. 
Thus, Snyder et al. (1954: 53) invited foreign policy analysts to incorporate 
domestic factors within the study of foreign policy decision-making. Since 
then, different scholars have focused on different aspects of internal and 
external factors that affect foreign policy decisions (Hudson and Vore 1995: 
212-215).  
Throughout 1970s and 1980s cognitive and psychological factors have 
been introduced to the FPA literature. For instance, Graham Allison (1971; 
1972) and Morton Halperin (1974) have focused on the impact of intra-state 
bureaucratic dynamics on foreign policy-making. Kalevi Holsti (1970) argued 
that states have national role conceptions which they seek to capture through 
the conduct of foreign policy. Margaret Hermann (1974; 1977; 1980a; 1980b) 
and Ole Holsti (1977; 1989) have developed studies on the impact of 
individual leaders (such as their leadership style, the leaders’ psychology and 
perceptions) in foreign policy-making. Jervis (1976) and Cottam (1977) 
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focused on the impact of leaders’ perceptions and misperceptions upon 
foreign policy (Hudson, 2005: 11; see also Hudson and Vore, 1995: 212-220). 
By the end of 1980s, Robert Putnam’s (1988) emphasis on the “two-level 
game” emphasizing the interaction between domestic and foreign policy was 
crucial, as it raised major questions regarding the impact of domestic social 
groups on the foreign policy of a state. As Hudson (2005: 12) points out, Levy 
(1988), Levy and Vakili (1989), Lamborn and Mumme (1989), Evans et al. 
(1985), Hagan (1987), and Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry (1989) were 
important contributors to the study of domestic - foreign policy relationship. 
FPA has developed an actor-specific study perspective in the post-Cold 
War era. Through utilizing political psychology, FPA researchers have 
developed theories on leadership styles and cognitive processes involved in 
decision-making. They have used methods such as “content analysis, in depth 
case study, process-tracing, agent-based computational models and 
simulations” (Hudson, 2005: 14).  
In time, FPA has evolved into a large literature that focuses on a variety 
of aspects including culture, psychology, regime type, economy, social factors, 
bureaucratic structure, and identity. Within this large and complex structure, 
one can see that these scholars have generally been divided between two 
general approaches in their analysis: the “Rational” and “Cognitive” 
approaches. The latter argues that decision-makers’ beliefs, perceptions, 
desires and/or moods play an important role on how they perceive their 
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environment and make decisions. The former, which is better known as the 
“Rational Actor Model (RAM)”, has generally ignored the cognitive processes 
that occur within the state (Rosati, 2000). As Neack (2008: 43) points out; 
“typically, foreign policy scholars explain that the rational actor model and the 
cognitive model are incompatible.” While Cognitive approaches study the 
impact of “beliefs” and the dynamics of the decision-making “process”, RAM 
deals with “preferences” and “outcomes” (Neack, 2008: 43-45; Rosati, 2000). 
However, contrary to this “incompatibility” argument, there are also studies 
that try to bridge the two approaches. Specifically, Poliheuristic Theory 
develops a foreign policy decision-making model that uses both cognitive and 
rational approaches. 
 
 
2.1.2. The Poliheuristic (PH) Theory: Main Authors and Cases 
 
Alex Mintz, who is one of the main figures in PH theory literature, mentions 
that the term “Poliheuristic” can be “broken down into the roots poly (many) 
and heuristic (shortcuts), which alludes to the cognitive mechanisms used by 
decision-makers to simplify complex foreign policy decisions” (Mintz et al., 
1997: 554).The theory was offered as an alternative to the existing decision-
making models such as the rational actor, bureaucratic politics, cybernetics, 
and the expected utility models.  
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The difference stems from the ‘two-stage’ decision-making model of the 
PH theory. The theory argues that decision-makers follow “a two-stage 
decision process consisting of (a) rejecting alternatives that are unacceptable 
to the policy maker on a critical dimension or dimensions and (b) selecting an 
alternative from the subset of remaining alternatives while maximizing 
benefits and minimizing risks” (Mintz, 2004: 4-5). The critical dimension 
mentioned in “stage a” is argued to be the domestic political dimension. The 
cognitive approach is applied to analyze the first and the rational approach is 
applied at the second stage of the PH analysis. The policy makers tend first to 
eliminate some of the alternatives by considering their domestic political 
implications when they are faced with a number of policy alternatives (A1, A2, 
A3, A4… An) and with a number of utility dimensions (domestic politics, 
economic, military, strategic ...etc.). This elimination is based on the leaders’ 
‘decision rule’ (which is identified by the policy analyst) that is used as a 
‘cognitive shortcut’ (or ‘decision heuristic’) in the first stage. Then, in the 
second stage, they make their decision through rational utility calculations. As 
many proponents of the PH theory mentioned: “domestic politics is the 
essence of decision” (see Mintz, 1993, 2003, 2004, 2005; Mintz and Geva, 
1997; Mintz et al., 1997). With its focus on this two stage process, the PH 
Theory “integrates elements of the cognitive psychology school of decision-
making with elements of the rational choice school” (Mintz, 2004: 4). 
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Although the PH theory is relatively new (since it has been introduced in 
1993) it has been published in more than 40 articles in leading journals such 
as “the American Political Science Review, Journal of Conflict Resolution, and 
International Studies Quarterly, as well as in book chapters, edited volumes, 
and numerous conferences” (Mintz, 2004: 4) The theory has been applied to a 
variety of decisions including: decisions to use force ( Mintz, 1993; DeRouen, 
2001, 2003), tests of  Nuclear weapons (Sathasivam, 2003), Coalition 
formation and intraparty rivalry (Mintz, 1995), Influence of advisers 
(Redd,2002), War and peace decisions (Astorino-Courtois and Trusty, 2000), 
Conflict resolution (Astorino-Courtois and Trusty, 2000) and military uprising 
(Mintz and Mishal, 2003). It proposes a model to explain how and why leaders 
make certain foreign policy decisions and what factors affect their utility 
calculations in the process (see Mintz, 2004: 4). In that sense, it focuses on 
both the “process” and the “outcome” of decision-making. 
The PH theory has been applied both to democratic and authoritative 
contexts including decisions made by American presidents and the decisions 
made by the leaders in the Middle East. It has been tested through multiple 
methods such as case studies, formal and statistical models, and experimental 
analysis (See Mintz, 2004). By these applications and tests, the theory has 
built its basic principles and proposed several steps of constructing a decision-
making model. The following two sections explain the core principles and 
basic steps in building a Poliheuristic decision-making model. 
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2.1.3. Basic Principles of the PH Theory 
 
This thesis argues that cognitive processes play a significant role in foreign 
policy-making, especially under conditions of uncertainty where actors face a 
large number of policy alternatives to choose from. A bridge between 
cognitive and rational approaches is argued to be useful to have a better 
understanding of specific foreign policy actions. Individuals generally have “a 
set of beliefs and personal constructs” about their environment which make 
them perceive the complex “physical and social environment” in a more 
coherent and organized way. “These beliefs and constructs necessarily 
simplify and structure the external world“(Rosati, 2000, p. 57).  
The PH theory contends that leaders make their foreign policy decision 
in a two-stage process. “The first stage of Poliheuristic Theory involves a non-
compensatory, non-holistic search. It uses decision heuristics and primarily 
corresponds to the cognitive school of decision-making” (Mintz, 2004: 4). The 
argument is that when faced with a set of alternatives, under complex 
situations and uncertainty, decision-makers tend to use “cognitive-shortcuts” 
in order to simplify the situation. The decision-makers tend to eliminate the 
alternatives that do not fit their personal perceptions and expectations 
(Mintz, Geva, Redd, and Carnes, 1997; DeRouen, 2000; Redd, 2001; 
Sathasivam, 2002). The process is, therefore, conceptualized as the “Non-
compensatory principle” in decision-making (Brule, 2005; Mintz, 1993).  
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Mintz (1993: 598) posits that while making decisions, foreign policy 
makers act with a “non-compensatory strategy” in the first stage of decision-
making. According to this strategy, “in a choice situation, if a certain 
alternative is unacceptable on a given dimension (e.g., it is unacceptable 
politically), then a high score on another dimension (e.g., the military) cannot 
compensate/counteract for it and hence, the alternative is eliminated” (Mintz, 
1993: 598). A policy alternative will be regarded as unacceptable or 
acceptable according to the decision rule of the leaders which is identified by 
the policy analyst.  The non-compensatory principle uses a “non-holistic” way 
of analysis rather than analyzing and comparing different dimensions of the 
policy alternatives in a “holistic” manner like expected utility theory and 
cybernetics models (these models apply a compensatory principle). As Mintz 
et al. (1997) explain “Non-holistic models (…) employ a simplified process 
whereby the decision-maker sequentially eliminates or adopts alternatives ‘by 
comparing them to each other, or against a standard, either across 
dimensions or across alternatives’” (Mintz, Geva and Derouen, 1997: 442). 
The PH theory proposes a “non-holistic” model by emphasizing that foreign 
policy makers choose a critical dimension (this is generally the political 
dimension). It argues that the decision-maker, rather than making “detailed 
and complicated comparisons” of all dimensions of each alternative, 
eliminates those that do not satisfy the expected value at the “critical 
dimension” (Mintz, 1993: 598-599; See also, Mintz 2004; Redd 2002, 2005; 
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and Brule, 2005; see Mintz, Geva and Derouen, 1997 for a detailed 
explanation of holistic/non-holistic decision rule).  
To put it in a simple example, suppose that a foreign policy maker has 
two different alternatives (A1, A2) and each alternative has three utility 
dimensions (political, military, and economic).  The policy-maker attributes 
values between 3 and 0 to each alternative on each dimension based on the 
utility of each alternative. The table is as follows: 
 
Table 2.1. - A Simple Decision Matrix 
Alternatives Dimensions Total Units of 
utility (Sum) Political Military Economic 
A1 3 1 1 3+1+1= 5 
A2 1 3 3 1+3+3= 7 
   
 
According to the table the policy-maker attributes a higher value to A1 in the 
political dimension but a higher value to A2 in the Military and Economic 
dimensions. A foreign policy analyst using the compensatory strategy (with a 
holistic model of analysis and in its simplest sense) might argue that the 
decision-maker will sum the values of each alternative and make his decisions 
based on the maximum utility. Following the compensatory strategy then, the 
decision-maker expects to gain 7 units of utility by choosing A2 whereas s/he 
gains 5 by choosing A1. Accordingly, a decision-maker following the 
compensatory strategy will choose A2 instead of A1 since the expected utility 
of the former is greater than the latter. However, a non-compensatory 
strategy might bring a different choice. As mentioned above, a non-
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compensatory, non-holistic model argues that one of the dimensions might be 
taken as the critical one. For instance, if the decision-maker takes the political 
dimension of the alternatives as the “critical dimension”, then he will choose 
A1 since it provides a greater value than A2 in the political dimension. In other 
words, since the decision-maker follows a non-compensatory strategy, the 
additional 4 units of utility provided by A2 in military and economic 
dimensions will not “compensate” the loss of 2 units in the political 
dimension. Since the political dimension is the most critical one for the 
decision-maker, other dimensions of the policy alternatives will not be 
comparable with it; hence, the other dimensions will not be compensatory. 
When a decision-maker faces a number of policy alternatives (A1, A2, A3…An), 
each having a number of utility dimensions (Political, Economic Military, 
Cultural…etc.), alternatives that do not satisfy the ‘decision rule’ are 
eliminated. In terms of the theory, the decision-maker eliminates the 
alternatives that do not fulfill his/her utility conditions by using “cognitive 
shortcuts”. The example given by Mintz (1993: 599) might simplify this 
description: “a person who suffers from high levels of cholesterol is unlikely to 
buy himself items rich in cholesterol, even if these are offered at a huge 
discount.” (See Mintz, Geva and Derouen, 1994: 453-457 for a more 
sophisticated and formal explanation of the non-compensatory principle) 
The decision-maker starts “analytical processing” in the second stage 
after eliminating some of the foreign policy alternatives (those do not provide 
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enough utility in the critical dimension) with a non-compensatory principle in 
the first stage. The surviving alternatives are generally compared using 
rational actor models. As Mintz (2004: 4) points out: “Cognitive heuristics are 
more important in the first stage of the decision, whereas rational choice 
calculations are more applicable to the second stage of the poliheuristic 
decision process.” 
 
 
2.2. Building a Poliheuristic Decision-making Model: 
 
The PH theory proposes a unified set of principles that could be applied to 
leaders’ decision-making processes. As Mintz (2005) points out: 
              The PH procedure consists of two key steps: 
1. Identify the decision matrix of the leader (e.g., the alternative set, 
dimension set, and implications of each alternative on each 
dimension) 
2. Apply PH calculations to the decision matrix to explain or predict 
the ultimate choice. 
 
The theory is argued to be “generic” meaning that it could be applied to 
almost all foreign policy decisions including: “national security decisions”, 
“foreign economic decisions”, as well as “domestic decisions” (e.g., Astorino- 
Courtois, 2000; DeRouen, 2003; Sathasivam, 2003)” (Mintz, 2005: 95).  
 The foreign policy analyst builds the decision matrix of the leader in 
the first step. While building the “Decision Matrix” the analyst needs to 
identify: 1. The Foreign policy alternatives (A1, A2, A3… An.) 2. The Utility 
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Dimensions of each alternative (D1, D2, D3…Dn.) 3. The implications of foreign 
policy alternatives on each dimension. 4. The ratings of each alternative at 
each dimension. 5. The weight of each dimension (Mintz, 2005). 
  The foreign policy alternatives are those options that are available to 
the foreign policy maker before the decision is made. The foreign policy 
analyst asks the following question: “what are the set of available options that 
the foreign policy maker can choose from”. For example, in a crisis situation 
the leader might have the following foreign policy alternatives: use force (A1), 
do nothing (A2), and use economic sanctions (A3). 
The analyst decides on the dimensions of each alternative after the 
identification of the set of alternatives. These dimensions are used to evaluate 
and compare the utility that each alternative is expected to provide. For the 
crisis situation example the dimensions could be: 1. Domestic political 
dimension (D1), 2. Military / strategic dimension (D2) and 3. Economic 
dimension (D3).  
The dimensions are used as utility criteria. Each foreign policy 
alternative has implications (which are used to identify the utility of each 
alternative) at each dimension. For instance, the economic sanctions 
alternative has economic implications, military implications and domestic 
political implications. 
According to these implications each foreign policy alternative will have 
a value on each dimension. Based on these values, although it is not 
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compulsory for the model, the foreign policy analyst can rate each alternative 
on each dimension from “-10 (very bad) to +10 (very good)” (Mintz, 2005: 96). 
For example the “Do Nothing Option” in the above mentioned example has 
domestic political implications such as harming the domestic political support 
of the leader. In addition it might be less costly in the economic dimension 
(since no military or economic action is taken) and more costly in the 
military/strategic dimension (since it will give the message to the opposition 
that the country is not powerful enough). Based on these implications, when 
compared with choosing the “economic sanctions” alternative, “Do nothing” 
might be rated -9 in political, +8 in economic, - 10 in military dimensions 
whereas the “Economic Sanctions” alternative is rated +5 in political, -5 
Military/strategic and -8 in economic dimensions. These ratings will help the 
analyst to compare the alternatives and propose the best option to be chosen 
in the foreign policy-making process. After the identification of the set of 
alternatives and dimensions and the rating of each alternative based on their 
implications on these dimensions, the policy analyst can also identify weights 
for each dimension if he thinks that the economic, military and political 
dimensions of the policy alternatives do not have equal weight. 
According to these explanations the decision matrix of the crisis 
situation can be built as follows. Suppose that there is a crisis situation. In a 
simplified model the alternatives are: 1. Do nothing (A1), 2. Apply Economic 
sanctions (A2), 3. Use Force (A3). The dimensions are: 1. Political, 2. Strategic, 
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and 3. Economic. A1 is rated -10 in political, +5 in Strategic and +5 in the 
Economic dimension. A2 is rated +5 in political, +5 in strategic and -5 in the 
economic dimension. A3 is rated +3 in political, +8 in strategic and -8 in 
economic dimensions. The decision matrix in this crisis model is as follows: 
 
Table 2.2 - The Decision Matrix of a Hypothetical Crisis Scenario  
Alternatives 
Dimensions Total Utility 
provided by 
alternatives
(Average) 
Political (D1) Military 
(D2) 
Economic 
(D3) 
Do nothing (A1) Implications 
(or Rating)  
-10 
Implication
s (or Rating) 
+5 
Implications 
(or Rating) 
-5 
-10/3  
(-3,33) 
Econ. Sanctions 
(A2) 
Implications 
(or Rating) 
+5 
Implication
s (or Rating) 
+5 
Implications 
(or Rating) 
-5 
 
5/3 
 (1,66) 
Use force  (A3) Implications 
(or Rating) 
+3 
Implication
s (or Rating) 
+8 
Implications 
(or Rating) 
-8 
3/1 
 (1) 
 
“PH theory predicts that alternatives that have a very negative value on the 
political dimension will be discarded first, while remaining alternatives will be 
evaluated based on rational calculations ”(Mintz, 2005: 97). As mentioned 
above, the non-compensatory principle argues that other dimensions of the 
foreign policy alternatives cannot compensate for the political dimension. 
Since the poliheuristic theory assumes that domestic politics is the essence of 
decision, the policy analyst will eliminate the alternatives that have negative 
values in the political dimensions. In the crisis example above the alternative 
of “do nothing” will be eliminated in the first stage of decision-making. In the 
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second stage the decision-maker will compare and “select from the remaining 
alternatives, the alternative that has the best net gain on all dimensions (or on 
the dimension most important to the decision-maker -a lexicographic decision 
strategy)” (Mintz, 2005: 97). At this stage, the proponents of PH theory 
generally use “expected utility calculations” in order to select the alternative 
that provides the greatest utility. As Mintz (2005: 97) posits: “The ultimate 
decision then is a combination of discarding infeasible alternatives in the first 
phase of the decision and selecting the best alternative from the subset of 
acceptable alternatives in the second phase of the decision.” 
A crucial task for a foreign policy analyst applying the PH theory to a 
foreign policy decision is to justify the values allocated to foreign policy 
alternatives in different dimensions. Avoiding biased and subjective 
evaluations will provide a more acceptable analysis of the foreign policy 
making process. In the application chapter (see Chapter 4), the thesis uses an 
alternative evaluation method to overcome this risk. As it analyzes AKP 
leaders’ decision to choose a new foreign policy orientation instead of other 
alternatives, the thesis uses two types of information: first the TFP literature is 
explained in chapter 3. Then, AKP leaders’ speeches in 2003 are analyzed and 
their foreign policy vision is summarized in chapter 4. The information given in 
the literature about the major determinants of TFP is organized in line with 
AKP leaders’ foreign policy vision while constructing the PH decision matrix. 
With reference to both sources of information the thesis defines some 
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evaluation criteria in order to rank the foreign policy alternatives in terms of 
an ‘order of preference’. Finally, scores are assigned according to these 
preference orderings. Existing foreign policy orientation alternatives, the 
utility dimensions, the evaluation criteria are all identified with reference to 
these two sources of information.  
 
 
2.3. Conclusion: 
 
This chapter provided a brief overview of the roots, and the basic principles of 
the PH decision-making model. It serves as a transition to the model that will 
be applied to TFP in the fourth chapter. To sum up, the PH theory has two 
core assumptions. The first, and arguably the most important, principle of the 
PH theory is that domestic politics is the “essence of decision”. The argument 
is that leaders, while choosing their foreign policy actions, tend to simplify 
their decision environment first by focusing on the domestic politics 
implications of their policies. As seen in the FPA literature (section 2.a of this 
chapter) the argument is not unique to PH theory. Many foreign policy 
analysts have emphasized the interaction between the two levels (domestic 
and international). The PH theory has conceptualized the importance of 
domestic political dimension by claiming that the foreign policy makers act 
with the ‘non-compensatory principle’. According to this principle, the utility 
provided by the foreign policy alternatives in other dimensions- be it military, 
economic, strategic or ideational- cannot compensate for the loss of utility in 
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the domestic politics dimension; hence, domestic politics dimension is the 
critical dimension and it is non-compensatory.  
The second principle of the PH theory is that decision-making is a two-
staged process. In the first stage, the policy-maker tends to use cognitive 
shortcuts (heuristics) meaning that by applying the non-compensatory 
principle the decision-maker tends to simplify the decision environment 
through eliminating the foreign policy alternatives that do not satisfy the 
‘decision rule’ in the domestic politics dimension.  In the second stage, the 
policy-maker chooses one of the remaining alternatives by making expected 
utility calculations by using the rational-choice approach. In that sense the 
theory argues to be a bridge between cognitive and rational approaches. 
 The PH theory is argued to be “generic” and it provides a useful model 
to analyze foreign policy choices of leaders. The application of the 
poliheuristic (PH) decision- making theory is argued to be a useful way to 
provide a concrete, simple, and organized explanation for Turkey’s foreign 
policy orientation in the AKP period. 
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CHAPTER III:  
 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE TFP LITERATURE 
 
 
 
Most of the post-Cold War studies on TFP claim that Turkey has followed an 
active foreign policy in the 1990s and 2000s (Çelik, 1999; Hale, 2000; 
Makovsky and Sayari, 2000; Kut, 2001; Rubin, 2001; Robins, 2003; Larrabee 
and Lesser 2003; Martin and Keridis, 2003; Murinson, 2006). Especially after 
the 2002 elections, when AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi- Justice and 
Development Party) formed a majority government, the previous wave of 
foreign policy activism has gained momentum. According to Öniş, the AKP 
government has pursued a new wave of activism, first, by speeding up the 
Europeanization process (between 2002-2005 as the golden age of 
Europeanization) and then, when the Europeanization process fell into a 
stalemate after the negotiations for full membership were formally opened in 
October 2005, by increasing Turkey’s regional role as a “benign Euro-Asian 
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soft Power” through the establishment of economic, cultural and political ties 
in its region (Öniş, 2009: 16; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2009).  
 The prospect of full membership to the European Union (EU) which 
was boosted after the 1999 Helsinki Summit, when EU granted candidate 
status to Turkey, was especially influential in the period between 1999- 2005. 
Although the Islamist background of the party generated some fear among 
the supporters of Europeanization in Turkey, the early years of the AKP 
government became the Golden Age of Europeanization when the 
government speeded up democratization (Özbudun, 2007) and economic 
reform process (Dervis et al. 2004; Öniş and Bakır, 2007) within the country. 
However, after 2005 a decline in AKP’s enthusiasm for Europeanization and 
increase in Turkey’s activism in the region is observed (Öniş, 2009; Çakmak, 
2008).  
 In general, this chapter serves as an overall summary of the main 
arguments in the TFP literature about the major determinants of AKP’s foreign 
policy orientation. This part aims at answering two main questions: to what 
extent does AKP’s foreign policy activism represent a divergence from the 
activism in the previous period (the post-Cold War 1990-2002 foreign policy)? 
How does the prospect of the EU membership affect AKP’s new foreign policy 
activism? Accordingly, it consists of three sections. The first section explains 
TFP in the 1990s. The second section analyzes the similarities and differences 
between the immediate post-Cold War Foreign policy activism (1990s) and 
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the activism in the AKP period (2002 onwards). The third section, explains the 
impact of Turkey’s EU membership perspective on AKP’s foreign policy 
activism.  
 
 
3.1. Turkey’s Post Cold War Foreign Policy: 
 
3.1.1. Foreign Policy Activism in the 1990s 
 
Systemic changes (the end of the Cold War), domestic political and economic 
crisis together with troubling developments in nearby regions, the Balkans 
and the Middle East, have been influential in TFP in the 1990s. Turkey was 
increasingly getting involved in the region and moving from a primarily 
Western oriented foreign policy towards a multi-dimensional one. This 
reorientation had impacts on its international relations. Turkey as an 
important regional actor, with the opportunities emerged after the Cold-War, 
has started to redefine its national interests in the period (Larrabee and 
Lesser, 2003).  
 One of the major reasons behind this redefinition was the end of the 
Cold War and change in the international bipolar structure. The strict East- 
West division of the previous period changed with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. This change had both negative and positive effects on TFP. One of the 
positive effects was that Turkey did not share a land border with Soviet Union 
(then Russia) anymore. This has, to a great extent, decreased the Russian 
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threat in the eastern regions of Turkey.  Second, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union created a power vacuum around Turkey, both in the Caucasus and the 
Balkans. This vacuum, in turn, provided Turkey with opportunities to improve 
its relations in those regions.  Turkish foreign policy makers started to stress 
Turkey’s leading role in the region and emphasize its historical and cultural 
ties with the Turkic and Muslim countries in the Caucasus and the Balkans. On 
the other hand, the negative effect was that Turkey’s geostrategic importance 
for its Western allies has, to a great extent, decreased with the collapse of the 
communist Soviet Union. Turkey tried to overcome this negative effect by 
getting actively involved in the region and trying to obtain a regional 
leadership role. These conditions, in general terms, have led to an assertive, 
multi-dimensional and military-oriented foreign policy vision in Turkey (see 
Oran, 2001: 204-239; See also Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; and Murinson, 
2006).  
 TFP was assertive in the sense that it followed ‘confrontational tools’ 
not only in Iraq against PKK (Kurdish separatists) but also against Syria (by 
deploying troops on the border in 1998) and Greece (especially on the Cyprus 
issue) until the end of 1990s (Öniş 2003; See also Kirişçi 2006). It was multi-
dimensional since there had been a change in  ‘vision’ from the “sacredness of 
the borders and the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli)” understanding towards an 
aim of “getting beyond the borders and creating a regional sphere of 
influence in the Balkans, Mediterranean and Caucasus” (Gözen 2006:80).  
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Two major developments have been crucial in Turkey’s foreign policy 
vision in the period: the Gulf War (1990- 1991) and the opportunities that 
emerged in Eurasia, especially in the Caucasus, with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. During the Gulf War, by participating in the ‘Operation Provide 
Comfort’, Turkish Armed Forces utilized the opportunity to attack the bases of 
the PKK in Northern Iraq and establish a secure zone in Turkish- Iraqi border. 
Particularly in its south-Eastern border but generally in the whole surrounding 
regions, Turkey tried to establish a strategic sphere of influence, which was 
especially based on Military power and Geographical location. Turkey has 
followed a realist approach to foreign policy by trying to fill-in the power 
vacuum and to increase its influence in the region. The main aim was to 
obtain a regional leadership role through this active involvement (Gözen 
2006: 79- 84). However, this realist approach has led to a more 
confrontational and military weighted foreign policy in Turkey.  
 The geostrategic discourse and use of confrontational tools was, 
partly, due to the increased role of military in foreign policy-making (see Bilgin 
2005). The decisions given by the National Security Council (NSC), although 
they were constitutionally limited to be advisory, were taken seriously by the 
governments; so much that the military became the dominant actor even in 
the daily domestic politics of Turkey (see Özcan 2001). The involvement of 
military was due to the fact that Turkey was facing instability in its domestic 
politics because of the frequent government changes, the Kurdish separatist 
 30 
 
movement and intensified PKK terrorist attacks, and the securitization of 
political Islam. As a result of these developments, Turkish Armed Forces 
obtained an important role in both domestic and foreign policy of Turkey 
which led to the re-emergence of the ‘Sevres Syndrome’ which was, in Aydın’s 
(2004) words, a ‘structural determinant’ of TFP. The dominance of military, 
combined with the uncertainties of the post-Cold War era, Turkey’s 
perception that it is losing its geostrategic importance for its Western allies, 
and the Realist approach to foreign policy, made Turkey feel entrapped by the 
Greeks in the West, Syria in the South East and Kurdish separatists from inside 
(see Oran 2001: 236). Turkey’s wish to utilize the opportunities at the end of 
the Cold War together with the fear of abandonment and losing territories 
have resulted in an active but confrontational foreign policy throughout the 
1990s. 
 These developments, in turn, have put Turkey into serious dilemmas. 
For instance, Turkey’s confrontational and active involvement in the Middle 
East was not appreciated by the EU.  In Larrabee and Lesser’s (2003) words, 
“the deeper its involvement in the Middle East, the more problems this poses 
for Turkey’s Western orientation and identity.” EU leaders were emphasizing 
problems about Turkey’s Western identity and the possibility that the EU 
would be dragged into complex problems in the Middle East if Turkey became 
a member. Another dilemma was caused by Turkey’s aim to improve its 
relations with the countries in the Caucasus. Turkey, whereas trying to 
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increase its commercial relations and economic cooperation with the region, 
was facing the possibility of confrontation with Russia. In this sense, Turkey’s 
decisions were crucially important for the Russian- Turkish interactions in the 
1990s. Additionally, Turkey’s stance against the conflicts in the Balkans, during 
and after the dissolution of Yugoslavia did also create a dilemma for Turkey. 
While helping the Muslims in the Balkans, Turkey was taking the risk of falling 
into a conflict with Serbia. 
 Beside the above-mentioned negative aspects, there were also some 
positive improvements in Turkey’s international relations in this period. 
Turkey’s participation in the Gulf war and its contributions to the settlement 
of the disputes in the Balkans, improved Turkey-US relationship. The US 
started to regard Turkey as its ‘strategic partner’ and an influential actor in 
the region (Fuller et al. 1993; see also Larrabee and Lesser 2003). That is not 
to say that Turkey-US relations were totally positive in the period. For 
instance, Turkey’s cross-border operations in Northern Iraq had some side 
effects because it was not appreciated by the US administration. However, in 
general, Turkey- US relations improved in the 1990s (Gözen 2006: 83).  
 In one of his articles, Robins (2007) mentions that major studies on TFP 
started after the 1990s. That is the case, not as a coincidence but because of 
the variety of foreign policy issues -including the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the rising instability In the Balkans, the first 
Gulf War (1990-1991), NATO and EU enlargement, in which Turkey was 
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actively involved and which were crucially important developments for the 
emergent new post-Cold War world order. As Kut and Özcan (2000) points 
out, it was ‘The Longest Decade’ in TFP since the foundation of the Republic. 
The long decade of 1990s provided fruitful results for the 2000s. As it will be 
explained in the following section, although both foreign policy approaches 
were aiming at active involvement in the surrounding regions, TFP in the 
2000s, especially during the AKP period, has slight differences from that of the 
1990s. 
 
 
3.1.2. Foreign Policy Activism in the AKP Era: 
 
The foreign policy activism of the previous decade gained momentum in the 
2000s. However, the approach or ‘vision’ behind this activism was different 
from that of the previous era. Especially after 2002 elections, when AKP won 
the elections and established a single-party government, Turkey started to 
follow an even more active foreign policy than the previous decade. Contrary 
to the hard/confrontational foreign policy of the 1990s, AKP has followed a 
soft/diplomatic foreign policy (See Murinson 2006; Çakmak 2009; Öniş and 
Yılmaz, 2005; 2009; Çakmak 2009; see also Davutoğlu 2010). 
 According to the literature on TFP, there are three main factors behind 
this change:  The first factor is the role of the US and international system; the 
second factor is the role of the AKP government and domestic politics; and 
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the third factor is the role of the EU membership prospect. There was a boost 
in Turkish foreign policy activism due to the 1999 Helsinki decision of the EU 
when the Union decided to grant candidate status to Turkey. This, in turn, 
encouraged the Turkish government to enter into an active Europeanization 
process (Öniş 2009; See also Öniş and Yılmaz 2009; Gözen 2006) and a process 
of an active engagement in the region. 
 In the international arena, especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
the US started to follow a ‘unilateral’ foreign policy, by waging a global war 
against terrorism without responding to the international criticisms against it. 
As a first step, it attacked Afghanistan and then Iraq for their support to 
terrorist activities. In response to this hard unilateralism, both European 
states and the states in the Middle East and the Muslim world developed a 
negative anti-American stance. It can be argued that, especially the war on 
Iraq, and the anti-American stance that emerged in the period was one of the 
reasons that have led Turkey closer to the EU and start the rapid 
Europeanization process. “In retrospect, the war has helped to tilt the balance 
of power within Turkey’s domestic politics further in the direction of the ‘pro-
EU coalition’ which had already been gathering strength particularly since the 
Helsinki decision of 1999”(Öniş and Ylmaz 2005). 
 Under that international system Turkey went to elections in November 
2002 and AKP won a landslide victory. AKP, in Erdoğan’ s words, was a 
‘conservative democratic’ party but most of the people believed that it was 
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also a religious party since most of its members, including R.Tayyip Erdoğan 
and Abdullah Gül (the leaders of the party), had previously been members of 
the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi). Although some religious 
connotations existed in its discourse, AKP did not establish a religion-based 
foreign policy orientation. Instead, by using Turkey’s historical and cultural 
background and religious identity as an asset, AKP has tried to establish 
Turkey, in Öniş’s words, as a regional ‘Euro-Asian Soft Power’ that connects 
the Muslim world with the Western Christian world (see Öniş, 2009; Öniş and 
Yılmaz, 2009). Accordingly Turkey followed a ‘zero-problem with neighbors’ 
policy, by getting actively involved in regional activities, establishing economic 
and strategic agreements, and attempting to solve its major disputes with its 
neighbors. Although the “Bridging the East with the West” discourse was not 
a new agenda for Turkey (see Yanık, 2009; 2011), compared to the previous 
governments, the AKP government has made the greatest effort among the 
Turkish governments in order to achieve this aim. 
 Some of the major policies of the period can be summarized as 
follows: Just after the elections, AKP government entered into a rapid 
Europeanization process and achieved a great progress so that the EU 
formally opened the accession negotiations in October 2005. Turkey did not 
respond to all the US demands during the American military operation in Iraq 
of 2003, which in turn led to a problematic situation for Turkey’s military 
involvement in Northern Iraq against the PKK. Additionally, the AKP 
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government has made an important revision in Turkey’s Cyprus policy, by 
supporting the Annan Plan which caused a great improvement in Turkey- EU 
relations. The government has actively involved in regional organizations and 
supported the UN led ‘Alliance of Civilizations’ which emerged as a response 
to the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis. The AKP government has also supported 
the spread of transparency, democracy and liberal values in other Muslim 
countries (see Gözen 2006). 
 As the above-mentioned foreign policy activities are analyzed it 
becomes apparent that Turkey has not followed the same confrontational 
vision of the previous decade. Although a national-interest based approach 
has continued, AKP’s foreign policy vision is not so much confrontational as 
the previous era. One might argue that Turkey started to emphasize a 
combination of military/strategic values (emphasis on Turkey Regional 
leadership role and national interest) neoliberal/economic values (active 
involvement in regional IGO’s and initiation of economic and political 
cooperation with neighbors) and cultural/ideational values (emphasis on 
Turkey’s identity, shared cultural values with the regional countries and the 
construction of the ideational bridge between civilizations). 
 Compared to the ‘status-quo’ foreign policy (the foreign policy 
orientation of 1990s) there has been a revision in Turkish foreign policy 
understanding (See Güner, 2011). First of all, Turkey has left the heavy 
emphasis on protecting territory (the Sevres Syndrome). This has been so 
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because of the decreased impact of the military on foreign policy issues. One 
reason for this decrease is that the AKP government was a single-party 
government and Turkey did not suffer so much from domestic political 
instability as it did in the 1990s. Second, through the EU led democratization 
reforms the AKP government has managed to decrease the intervention of 
military in political affairs (See Özbudun 2007). These developments, in turn, 
have led Turkey to leave its heavy emphasis on strategy and military issues 
and follow a ‘soft’ and diplomatic foreign policy. So, the period was a period 
of: less emphasis on territory and more emphasis on economy; less emphasis 
on military, more emphasis on diplomacy; less emphasis on state-centricism, 
more emphasis on non-state actors (TUSIAD, Civil society organizations); and 
less emphasis on nationalism more emphasis on global dynamics (see Gözen 
2006: 87-95). 
 Öniş and Yılmaz (2009) explain Turkish post- Cold War foreign policy in 
three periods: “an initial wave of foreign policy activism in the immediate 
post-Cold War context [1990s]; a new or second wave of foreign policy 
activism during the Justice and Development Party government era with a 
strong emphasis on Europeanization[2002-2005]; and the more recent 
tension between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism [post-2005 period]. The 
first two periods are explained above. In the next section the third period will 
be explained. 
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3.1.3. The impact of Europeanization and the post-2005 period 
 
The prospect of full membership, which was boosted after the 1999 Helsinki 
summit, when EU granted candidate status to Turkey, was especially 
influential in the period between 1999 and 2005. Although the Islamist 
background of the party generated some fear among the supporters of 
Europeanization in Turkey, the early years of the AKP government became the 
Golden Age of Europeanization, when the government speeded up the 
democratization (Özbudun, 2007) and economic reform processes (Dervis et 
al. 2004; Öniş and Bakır, 2007) within the country (Robbins, 2003; Çakmak, 
2008; Öniş, 2009). It can also be argued that AKP leaders followed an active 
regional policy in order to show Turkey’s role as an important regional actor 
and increase the prospect of membership. A careful reading of Davutoğlu’s 
arguments and a parallel analysis of Erdoğan and Gül’s speeches may clearly 
reveal this strategy.  
For instance, in his book, “Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International 
Standing”, Davutoğlu uses a “bow and arrow” metaphor to explain Turkey’s 
new foreign policy direction (Davutoğlu 2010: 551-63). In the metaphor, 
Turkey represents the arrow which is directed at Europe, and its foreign policy 
environment represents the bow.  The more Turkey strains the bow towards 
the Caucasus and the Middle East the faster it enters to the European Union. 
Following this analogy, one can argue that Turkey’s regional foreign policy 
activism has been used as a strategy to increase the prospect of EU 
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membership. Turkey’s leading role, together with Spain, in the “Alliance of 
Civilizations” project and Tayyip Erdoğan’s speeches regarding Turkey’s 
mediating role between the East and the West are all in parallel with 
Davutoğlu’s bow and arrow analogy. For instance, in one of his speeches 
Erdoğan says that “The idea of ‘Christian Europe’ belongs to the Middle Ages. 
It should be left there. There should be no doubt that Turkey’s full 
membership will re-enforce the desire and will for co-habitation between 
Christians and Muslims” (quoted in Kubiçek, 2004: 45). This expression can be 
used to exemplify the connection between Turkey’s vision of its role in the 
region and its EU membership. So, it can be argued that by continuously 
emphasizing Turkey’s bridging role, its role in the alliance of civilizations, and 
Turkey’s moderating role between Islamic World and the Christian World the 
AKP government has tried to improve its EU membership prospect. 
However, after 2005, although the EU formally opened the 
negotiations for full membership, it is observed by some scholars that there 
has been a decline in Turkey’s enthusiasm for European membership and an 
increase in its activism in the region (For instance see Alpay 2009; Öniş and 
Yılmaz 2009). In the post- 2005 period, it is argued that the EU membership 
process fell into a stalemate. Some authors claim that, although the EU 
formally opened the negotiation process, Turkey has lost its European 
direction because of the increasing criticisms against Turkey’s European(ness) 
and existing obstacles on the path to the EU (see Alpay 2009; Öniş and Yılmaz 
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2009; Elver 2005). Thus, Turkey started to turn towards its region and leave 
the EU path. According to Elver, this loss of enthusiasm was largely due to the 
obstacles on Turkey’s way to the EU membership. One of these obstacles is 
the resurgent anti-Muslim feelings in Europe. In addition, the Kurdish problem 
and the Cyprus issue also stand as other problems that Turkey should deal 
with before it gets access to the EU. The European Commission, in one of its 
reports, stated that the negotiation period is an open ended process that 
could continue for a long time without even giving a final date for Turkey’s 
accession (Elver 2005). 
 
 
3.2. Conclusion: 
 
To summarize the argument so far, Turkey has followed an assertive-
confrontational foreign policy, with a military/security emphasizing approach 
in 1990s. It was assertive because Turkey tried to utilize the opportunities that 
emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was confrontational 
because of the uncertainties in the region and aimed strictly at state centric 
national Interest perspective. In the 2000s, contrary to the confrontational 
tools that were used in the previous decade, Turkey started to emphasize 
diplomacy and politics instead of military and strategy. The first period of 
foreign policy activism (in 1990s) gained momentum with the 2002 elections 
and establishment of the single party government of AKP. The increased 
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emphasis on diplomacy, regional activism, and soft power (power of 
attraction) capabilities is due to three main reasons. First, US unilateralism 
caused an anti-American tendency which opened the way for Turkey to prove 
its reliability in the Middle East. The Anti-American tendency also pushed 
Turkey to the European Union which in turn has led to increased political and 
economic reform process. Second reason, is the policies of single party- 
government and domestic politics. Especially the Strategic Depth doctrine of 
Davutoğlu and AKP leaders’ emphasis on Turkey’s historical cultural and 
religious ties with the region have led Turkey to be actively involved in almost 
all activities in its surrounding region including the conflict resolution 
processes, regional IGO’s and economic and strategic initiatives. The existence 
of a single party government also decreased the political instability in the 
domestic politics of the country which left the influence of the Armed forces 
out of the political sphere. When the impact of Armed forces decreased in the 
foreign policy-making of Turkey, the emphasis on strategy, national power 
and confrontational tools have also decreased automatically. Finally the third 
reason was the prospect of EU membership which was boosted after the 1999 
Helsinki decision of the union.  
 As Davutoğlu once said, “Turkey, without having a solid stance in its 
surrounding regions, cannot become member of the European Union.” Until 
2005, Regional activism was (arguably) used as a strategy to enter into the 
European Union. However the official start of the accession negotiations in 
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2005 has changed this picture. The literature on EU-Turkey relations states 
that EU member states like France and Germany increased their criticisms 
against Turkey’s membership, Turkey will not overcome the obstacles on its 
path to EU, and because of such reasons Turkey has lost its enthusiasm to 
become a member of the union and started to turn its direction towards Asia 
and Middle East in order to become a regional power. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
MODELING TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 
 
The previous two chapters have listed the steps in building a PH model and 
explained TFP in the post-Cold War era. Academic works on TFP have 
generally remained descriptive without necessarily building a theoretical 
model. The aim of this chapter is to build a model in order to organize the 
information in the literature and provide an abstraction of the decision-
making process of Turkish foreign policy makers in the 59th government 
(founded by AKP in 2003). Accordingly, this section builds a PH model to 
analyze AKP’s decision to follow a new foreign policy orientation after 
assuming the government in 2003 by following the basic steps (described in 
chapter 2) and in line with the literature on TFP in the AKP period (given in 
chapter 3).  
An analysis of AKP’s foreign policy orientation generates at least three 
questions. First, given the Islamic roots and the anti-EU stance of AKP’s 
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political background (the Nationalist View tradition), why did the government 
follow an enthusiastic EU direction after assuming the government in 2002? 
Second, why did the AKP leaders decide to diverge from the SQ foreign policy 
of the 1990s by leaving the confrontational and military based orientation 
towards a more “soft power” oriented one? Third, why did the AKP 
government shift the foreign policy axis of the country by leaving the heavy 
emphasis on EU after starting the accession negotiations in 2005?  
Following a new foreign policy orientation instead of the foreign policy 
of the 1990s is a decision that was affected by both domestic and 
international variables. The model proposed by the PH theory provides space 
to integrate these variables in a systematic, formal and organized way. 
Although the literature provides answers to the above-mentioned questions, 
a PH model could be useful to show the dynamics behind the decision in a 
more concrete and organized manner.  
The chapter is composed of two main parts. The first part builds the 
decision matrix of the AKP leaders by the time they assumed the government. 
Following the steps of building a PH model listed in chapter 2, it will identify: 
1. The Foreign policy alternatives (A1, A2, A3… An.) 2. The Utility Dimensions of 
each alternative (D1, D2, D3…Dn.) 3. The implications of foreign policy 
alternatives on each dimension and 4. It will give scores to each alternative at 
each dimension based on their implications. The second part will apply PH 
calculations and analyze AKP’s decision. The chapter ends with a discussion in 
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which the above mentioned three questions will be answered with reference 
to the “decision matrix” of AKP. 
 
 
4.1. The Decision Matrix of AKP in 2003: 
 
In order to build the decision matrix, the policy alternatives are to be 
identified first. The foreign policy alternatives are those options that were 
available to the foreign policy maker before making the decision. The foreign 
policy analyst asks the following question: “what is the set of available 
alternatives to choose from?” In the Turkish context these alternatives can be 
identified in Davutoğlu’s arguments, Erdoğan and Gül’s speeches, and the 
literature.  
Ahmet Davutoğlu is argued to be the architect of TFP in the AKP period 
(Murinson, 2006; Walker 2011). In his book “Strategic Depth: Turkey’s 
International Standing” he explains his vision of TFP in detail. When analyzed 
comparatively, it becomes apparent that there is a significant parallelism 
between Davutoğlu’s vision and Erdoğan and Gül’s speeches. It is possible to 
argue that this vision was largely adopted by the 59th government and the 
then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül; 
hence, any analysis of AKP’s foreign policy will be incomplete without 
referring to Davutoğlu’s arguments in detail. For the PH model at hand, 
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extracting some of AKP’s foreign policy alternatives from Davutoğlu’s vision of 
‘Turkey’s Strategic Depth’ might be a useful way to build the model. 
According to Davutoğlu (2010: 221-225) Turkey has started to search for a 
new “strategic position” with the emergent unease and surprising conditions 
after the end of the Cold War. The aim to utilize the opportunities created by 
the collapse of the Soviet Union together with the existing power vacuum in 
the Caucasus, the crisis in Iraq, the first Gulf War, the undulant Turkey-EU 
relations, the “Sevres Syndrome” and the perceived threat against the 
country’s territorial integrity have put Turkey into a confrontational stance in 
its foreign policy. The consequent heavy emphasis on security resulted in a 
conflictual relationship with the country’s neighbors characterized by 
“reflexive” and military oriented responses to political crisis. This 
confrontational stance has put Turkey into a serious dilemma since the 
emergent international structure required a multilateral and active foreign 
policy with an aim to improve relations with the neighboring regions. 
Accordingly, Turkey has actively participated in the reorganization process of 
regional multilateral cooperation and alliance initiatives like ECO (Economic 
Cooperation Organization), BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
Organization), OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference), D8 (Developing 
Eight). However, these initiatives have not been utilized in the desired way 
mostly because of their inefficient organizational structure and the lack of 
enthusiasm of the members. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey’s turbulent 
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domestic political and economic structure and its heavy emphasis on Security 
and territorial integrity in the conduct of foreign policy have also negatively 
affected the expected improvement of relations with neighboring regions. 
Thus, unrealistic and populist desires like creating a “Turkic World from the 
Adriatic to the Great Wall” (Adriyatik’ ten Çin Seddi’ ne Türk Dünyası) or 
“putting one and reaping five” (Bir koyup 5 Alma) have characterized the 
foreign policy of the 1990s. 
Davutoğlu (2010: 262) claims that throughout the 1990s, although 
Turkey aimed at active participation in its neighboring regions, it faced 
problems of credibility. Turkish foreign policy makers tended to regard 
regional cooperation initiatives like ECO, BSEC, OIC, and D8 as “reactive 
derivatives” of its relations with the west. More emphasis was given to these 
institutions when Turkey’s relations with EU or US did not continue in the 
desired way. This tendency had two-sided negative effects. On the one hand it 
decreased Turkey’s credibility in the Muslim world; on the other hand it did 
not have the desired impact over actors including US and EU. This, in turn, 
resulted in a multidimensional foreign policy in ‘rhetoric’ but a uni-
dimensional policy in ‘conduct’. He argues that Turkey should perceive the 
neighboring regions independent of its political relationship with the west. 
After explaining his perception of the 1990s, Davutoğlu proposes a new 
foreign policy orientation that would overcome the inefficiencies of TFP in the 
previous period. He argues that a country’s strategic depth becomes 
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meaningful if it is built upon the intersection of its “geo-cultural, geo-political 
and geo-economic” assets. Turkey has a strong infrastructure in terms of its 
historical ties, geographical location, population and culture to turn its 
potential power capacity into reality (Davutoğlu, 2010: 552-553). The “near 
land” (Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East), “near sea” (Black Sea, the Straits, 
Aegean and the Mediterranean seas, the gulf and Caspian seas) and “near 
continent” (Europe, North Africa, the Western and Central Asia) basins 
surrounding Turkey, puts the country geographically into the center of the 
world and historically in the central location where history took its shape. This 
gives an important strategic depth to the country which could not be utilized 
with a unidirectional foreign policy orientation; hence, Turkey has to follow a 
multidimensional foreign policy in order to use its historical, cultural and 
geographical assets efficiently. He argues that rather than isolating itself from 
the surrounding regions or following a single direction in foreign policy, 
Turkey should achieve a pivotal role among and improve its relations with the 
countries in its near land, near sea and near continental basins (see 
Davutoğlu, 2010: 551-563).  
Davutoğlu proposes an active, multi-dimensional foreign policy aimed at 
improving Turkey’s prestige and credibility among the countries in its near 
land, near sea and near continental basins and achieving a central role 
through utilizing its geographical, cultural, and historical assets. By ‘active’ he 
emphasizes participation in regional cooperation initiatives and that Turkey 
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has to earn greater representative capacity and political efficiency in those 
institutions (Davutoğlu, 2010: 262). ‘Multi-dimensional’ refers to the necessity 
that Turkey’s foreign policy approaches to its surrounding regions should be 
independent of each other. For instance, Turkey’s approach to the Middle 
East should not depend on the country’s undulant relations with the West. 
Thus, Turkey’s relations with the Middle East should not be seen as an 
alternative to the country’s relations with Europe or the US (see Davutoğlu, 
2010: 221-289, 551-564). 
A similar vision is also apparent in Gül and Erdoğan’s speeches 
throughout 2003. For instance, Erdoğan (2003b) refers to Turkey as the 
“historical, cultural and economic center of the region”. He argues that 
Turkey’s foreign policy dynamics have not been utilized efficiently in the 
previous period. Therefore, Turkey could not realize its true potential. 
According to Erdoğan, Turkey’s geographical, cultural and historical assets 
requires a multidimensional approach to foreign policy (Erdoğan, 2003e). 
Thus, the country, while preserving its EU direction, has to explain itself 
properly to the regional countries (Erdoğan, 2003d). In a speech given at his 
party meeting, Erdoğan clearly states that Turkey has followed an active and 
dynamic foreign policy aiming to “increase Turkey’s prestige” and prepare “a 
future suitable to Turkey’s past” (Erdoğan, 2003c). 
In the foreword of his book called “Abdullah Gül: Horizons of Turkish 
Foreign Policy in the New Century” which was published by the Turkish 
 49 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a collection of Gül’s speeches during his Foreign 
Ministry, Gül makes a very similar definition of the TFP in 1990s. He 
conceptualizes the previous TFP as “problem-driven”, “defense oriented”, and 
“reactive”. On the other hand he presents AKP’ s foreign policy as “pro-
active”, “soft-power oriented”, “problem-solving” and “spreading stability to 
its surrounding regions” (Gül, 2007: 16; see also Erdoğan, 2003a). In a speech 
given at the “Chatham House” in 2003 he refers to Turkey’s geostrategic 
importance, its “multi-dimensional” foreign policy and its relation to Turkey’s 
EU membership. He mentions that Turkey is committed to its relations with 
the west and EU membership. However a significant emphasis on “Turkey’s 
responsibility” to promote stability and “good future” in the Middle East is 
also visible in his speeches (Gül 2007: 32). Turkey’s improving relations with 
its surrounding regions are presented as an opportunity for the EU. In Gül’s 
words “Turkey’s size, scale, location, demographics, vocation, orientation, 
political system and her multi-regional and multi-dimensional peaceful foreign 
policy are all vital assets to Europe” (Gül 2007: 30). Similar references are 
made throughout all his speeches in 2003. For instance, Gül stresses Turkey’s 
participation in “regional cooperation” initiatives (2007: 33), its role to 
promote peace, security and cooperation in its neighboring regions including 
the Balkans and the African continent (2007: 51-52), its “historical and 
cultural” ties with the region (2007: 33-35, 47), its bridging role between the 
East and the West (2007: 43-46), its role to “remove the prejudices” against 
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Islam in the West (2007: 42), Its aim to promote the country’s prestige and 
credibility in the region (2007: 54) and its “active”, “multilateral”, and “zero-
problem with neighbors” oriented foreign policy (2007: 53-60). 
Both Davutoğlu and Gül explain TFP in 1990s as “confrontational”, 
“military and security oriented” and “problem–driven” whereas they propose 
a “non-confrontational”, “pro-active”, “problem-solving” foreign policy with 
an aim to improve the country’s prestige and credibility. The following section 
conceptualizes the foreign policy alternatives in line with this vision. 
 
 
4.1.1. Foreign policy Alternatives and Utility Dimension: 
 
i. The Set of Available Alternatives 
 
As it is mentioned in the previous chapter, the literature divides Turkey’s post-
Cold War foreign policy into three periods: the period before AKP (the 1990s), 
AKP foreign policy with a significant EU membership direction (2002-2005) 
and AKP foreign policy with an emphasis on independent regional activism 
(post-2005). These periods can be conceptualized as foreign policy 
alternatives that AKP leaders’ faced. For instance, while explaining TFP in the 
AKP period, Güner (2011: 1-2) conceptualizes two foreign policy orientation 
alternatives for Turkey: the “status-quo foreign policy (SQP)” referring to the 
preservation of Turkey’s foreign policy stance in the 1990s and “New Foreign 
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Policy (NWP)” referring to the foreign policy orientation followed by the AKP 
government. By taking Turkey as a rational actor, he proposes a game 
theoretical explanation to “the re-orientation of Turkish foreign policy” in the 
AKP period (Güner 2011: 1). He argues that “gains and costs occur with some 
probabilities that constitute decision-makers’ subjective estimates” and that 
these subjective estimations direct the leaders’ decisions (Güner 2011: 12-13). 
AKP leaders’ attribute utilities to these policy alternatives and choose the 
ones that are expected to provide the highest utility. By taking Güner’s (2011) 
conceptualization as a starting point, this thesis applies an alternative 
decision-making method (PH theory) to explain TFP in the AKP period. At least 
four different foreign policy alternatives can be identified When AKP leaders’ 
foreign policy vision is combined with the literature. 
The first foreign policy alternative (A1) for the AKP was to follow the SQ 
(status-quo) without changing the foreign policy orientation of the country. 
The SQ foreign policy orientation refers to the foreign policy orientation of 
1990s. It can be summarized as including the following components: 1. 
emphasis on Turkey’s relations with the West; 2. active foreign policy in the 
region in order to increase Turkey’s diminishing strategic importance after the 
Cold War; 3. confrontational foreign policy with a heavy emphasis on military 
power and security instead of friendly relations with the neighbors. 
The second foreign policy alternative (A2) was to follow a new foreign 
policy orientation including a degree of convergence with and divergence 
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from the previous period. It can be conceptualized as New Foreign Policy-A 
(NFP-A) which has the following components: 1. Heavy emphasis on Turkey’s 
commitment to EU membership; 2. An emphasis on Turkey’s pivotal role in 
the region, its cultural/ideational assets and Turkey’s role as a bridge between 
civilizations; 3. A Non-confrontational foreign policy orientation with an 
emphasis on friendly neighborhood and improving the country’s international 
relations.  
The third foreign policy alternative was slightly different from NFP-A in 
its components. It symbolizes AKP’s foreign policy orientation after 2005. It 
can be conceptualized as New Foreign Policy-B (NFP-B) with the following 
components: 1. Regional activism without a specific emphasis on the EU 
direction; 2. an emphasis on becoming a central country/an important 
regional power (a benign Euro-Asian soft power); and 3. a Non-
confrontational foreign policy orientation with an emphasis on soft-power 
and friendly neighborhood.  
The fourth foreign policy alternative (A4) is identified with reference to 
the political background of the party. As pointed above most of the party 
members, including Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül (leaders of the party), had 
previously been members of the Virtue Party (VP- Fazilet Partisi). The VP had 
been an extension of the “National Vision (NV- Milli Görüş)” movement which 
had supported an anti-European and anti-Western foreign policy. They have 
been against Turkey’s political union with the EU and did not support the 
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accession process. For the NV the EU was nothing more than an economic 
union to be benefited from (Doğan, 2005:  425). The Welfare Party supported 
a union with Arab and Muslim countries instead of Western ones. Since most 
of the members of AKP have previously been members of the NV movement, 
following the NV foreign policy was among the policy alternatives for AKP to 
choose from.  This alternative is conceptualized as NV foreign policy (NVP) and 
has the following components: 1. an emphasis on regional activism aiming at 
a union with the Arab and Muslim countries; 2. an anti-European and anti- 
Western stance; 3. an emphasis on Turkey’s pivotal role among the Muslim 
countries. 
The set of available alternatives were possibly larger at the time AKP 
was making its decision. However, given the information available in the 
literature and with reference to AKP leaders’ foreign policy vision these four 
alternatives stand as a good representation of the choice set that could have 
been constructed throughout that period. 
 
 
ii. The Utility Dimensions 
 
The PH theory assumes that domestic politics is the “essence of decision”. The 
alternatives that endanger the political survival of the leader would be 
eliminated at the first stage of decision-making based on the decision rule of 
the policy maker. Thus, any analysis applying PH model should take domestic 
 54 
 
politics as the essential dimension of each foreign policy decision. Accordingly, 
for the model at hand, we will assume that the first dimension (D1) is the 
“domestic politics dimension”. 
Although most of the scholars applying PH theory take military and 
strategic dimensions in their analysis of decision-making, these dimensions 
are decided with reference to the specific case at hand. Indeed, it is possible 
to argue that nearly all foreign policy decisions include military and/or 
strategic dimensions. In the Turkish case, as we analyzed in the first section of 
this chapter, AKP leaders have generally focused on military/strategic, 
economic and cultural/historical aspects of TFP. Thus for the model at hand, 
we will conceptualize the second dimension(D2) as the “military/strategic” 
dimension, third dimension (D3) as the “Economic” dimension and the last 
dimension (D4) as “Cultural/Ideational” dimension. 
 
 
4.1.2. Implications and the Evaluation Criteria: 
 
After identifying the set of alternatives and the dimensions, the alternatives 
will be evaluated and ranked based on the utility they are expected to 
provide. We need first to clarify the decision rule (or decision heuristic) of AKP 
leaders. According to the ‘decision rule’, the alternatives would be put into an 
order of preferences and evaluated consequently. 
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One needs to refer to the political background of AKP leadership and 
their vision on Turkey’s future in order to identify the decision rule (or the 
decision heuristic) of AKP. AKP emerged out of the Nationalist View (Milli 
Görüş) as a revisionist (in terms of their understanding of the role of Islam in 
Turkey) and modernist trend of political Islam in Turkey. The leaders of the 
party were former members of the Virtue Party which was closed by the 
Constitutional Court in the Early 2000s. With the closure of the VP party, the 
National Vision movement was divided into two groups: SP (Felicity Party) the 
conservative strand of the NV movement and AKP the “Young reformers” 
(Doğan, 2005: 429). After facing a number of cases and party closures, 
members of the NV tradition had entered into a process of transformation 
throughout the 1990s. Their aim to achieve hegemony in the Turkish political 
system was moderated towards an aim to “ensure survival in a hostile 
environment” (Öniş: 287). “The February 28 process which had brought down 
the Welfare Party … led the members and followers of the Virtue Party to the 
realization that democracy and human rights were basic needs that also 
applied to themselves”(Doğan, 427). Especially the founders of AKP –“Young 
Reformers”- have moderated their stance and left the traditional anti-EU 
discourse. Erdoğan was quick to announce that they have changed and that 
AKP is committed to Turkey’s EU accession process (Erdoğan, 2002). It is 
argued that, after the February 28 process and the closure of Welfare and 
Virtue Parties, showing a commitment to EU accession and stressing its 
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democracy and human rights criteria served as a protective shield or a source 
of legitimation for AKP.  In other words, following the same Islamic and anti-
EU discourse of the NV tradition would be a political suicide since it would put 
the party in the verge of closure. As Güner (2011: 9) mentions “they learn to 
adapt to realities of domestic politics by avoiding mistakes other Islam-
friendly parties committed…” (See also Cizre, 2008 quoted in Güner 2011). 
Thus, in a strictly secular and anti- Political-Islam environment created 
by the 1990s, the first aim of AKP was to achieve legitimacy and survival in 
domestic politics by showing that they have “truly” changed. In that sense, 
emphasizing Turkey’s EU direction was a part of their political decision rule. In 
fact, it is possible to claim that this strategy worked, by looking to the 
percentage of votes they got in the elections. Whereas the NV tradition with 
its fundamentalist anti-EU stance achieved its highest votes in 1995 by 21.5 
percent, AKP got 31, 2 in 2002 and gradually increased its share of votes later. 
Although moderation in discourse was not the only reason behind AKP’s 
gradual political success, it is clear that it had a significant impact. Now let us 
turn to the implications and ratings of each policy alternative. 
 
i. (D1) Domestic Politics: 
 
The decision rule of AKP serves as a cognitive shortcut for its policy makers to 
eliminate some of the alternatives based on their domestic politics 
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implications. “The decision-maker is expected to reject the alternatives that 
fail to satisfy some predetermined decision rule” (Brule 2005: 105). With 
regard to the literature given above, we assume that the decision rule of AKP 
was to “achieve legitimacy and political survival in an environment hostile to 
political Islam”. So the policy alternatives would be evaluated based on the 
answer of the following question: “Is Ax (x=1, 2, 3 or 4) expected to result in 
the political survival of AKP?” 
Those alternatives that result in a negative response will be eliminated in 
the first stage of the PH analysis. When analyzed, only A4 that is NVP results in 
a negative answer to this question. AKP leaders through a long “learning” 
process became aware that the discourse on political Islam should be 
moderated. In one of his speeches in 2003, Erdoğan distanced his party from 
the NV view tradition by claiming that they have “put off the Nationalist View 
shirt” and that they have “changed, changed and developed”  just after the 
election (Radikal, 2003). They have entered into a period of struggle to show 
that they have “truly” changed. Thus, when domestic politics were 
considered, following a foreign policy orientation previously offered by the NV 
tradition could be expected to provide the least utility among others.  
As we have previously stated, an emphasis on Turkey’s EU membership 
was regarded as a source of legitimacy for AKP leaders. In that sense, referring 
to the EU-led democratization process, the human rights and constitutional 
reforms would provide a protective shield for AKP leaders in their domestic 
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political activities. It also symbolized that they have changed their anti-
Western political origins. Thus an EU direction in the conduct of foreign policy 
could be expected to provide greater utility than other alternatives. This 
assumption puts A1 and A2 that are the SQ foreign policy and NFP-A in the 
higher end of the order of preferences. That is to say A1 and A2 were expected 
to provide greater utility than A3 (NFP-B) and A4 (NV). 
It is unrealistic to argue that AKP’s electoral success depends only on the 
moderation of their NV discourse. AKP entered into 2002 elections within a 
country of domestic political and economic turmoil. Turkey faced serious 
economic and political crisis in the period before elections. In that sense, it is 
reasonable to argue that the 2002 election was unique among the others. As 
Öniş and Keyman (2003) points out, in the previous two general elections 
(both 1996 and 1999) major political debates revolved around the unitary and 
secular nature of the state. Accordingly the existing political parties conducted 
their electoral campaign on the ‘hot topics’ including the threat of ‘political 
Islam’ and ‘Kurdish Separatism’. That is the reason why “the parties that fared 
the best, including the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the Nationalist Action 
Party (MHP), had state-centered or nationalist agendas” (Öniş and Keyman, 
2003: 96-97). However in 2002, just before the elections Turkey experienced 
the most serious economic crisis of its history and criticisms of “effective 
governance”, “accountability” and “social welfare” have replaced the previous 
hot topics. After years of problematic governments “the voters were ready to 
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cry ‘Enough!’ and to opt instead for a ruling structure that offered the 
prospect of being more responsive to society and its needs“ (Öniş and 
Keyman, 2003: 96). AKP, as a new party, was a reasonable alternative to the 
existing political parties. The party leaders were able to catch these dynamics 
by conducting an electoral campaign on these topics. They have criticized the 
other main parties for being too close to the state and to distant from the 
society. By referring to the existing corruption in the banking and financial 
system, they presented AKP as the prospect of honesty and accountability in 
government that regards the principles of “fairness” and “integrity” as major 
assets. Additionally they stressed reforms in democracy, individual rights and 
freedoms, economic and fiscal policies as the solution to the country’s crisis. 
They proposed to make reforms in Turkey’s economic and political system 
according to the criteria presented by international institutions including IMF 
(International Monetary Fund), WB (World Bank) and the EU (Öniş and 
Keyman, 2003: 96-100).  
In fact, these dynamics were also influential in the new foreign policy 
orientation (NFP-A) proposed by AKP. Although emphasizing Turkish 
membership to the EU was not a novel phenomenon in post-Cold War TFP, 
domestic dynamics in the 1990s were different from that of 2002; hence 
making the EU direction in NFP-A different from that of SQ. The EU emphasis 
was different for at least two reasons. First, the domestic political motivation 
for EU membership had not been as high as it was in 2002. As mentioned 
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above the hot topics of the 1990s were Kurdish Separatism and Political Islam. 
Second, the AKP inherited the government in the post-Helsinki period. The 
prospect of full membership to the EU was boosted after the 1999 Helsinki 
summit when EU granted candidate status to Turkey. This increased domestic 
political support for EU membership. In SQ foreign policy orientation the 
emphasis on EU membership suffered from what Uğur (1999) called “the 
Anchor-Credibility-Dilemma”. Whereas Turkey had been traditionally 
anchored to the EU, its leaders and society lacked the motivation for EU led 
reforms since there was no clear prospect for EU membership. Thus, in the SQ 
foreign policy orientation, emphasis on EU membership was a part of Turkey’s 
alignment with the West in its conduct of foreign policy. However, given the 
conditions under which AKP won the elections, the emphasis on EU 
membership could be regarded as a strategy to increase domestic support 
and achieve political legitimacy. Since membership to EU was a major 
component of A2 (NFP-A) then, it could be expected to provide greater utility 
than A1 (SQ) in domestic politics dimension. Thus, given the decision rule of 
AKP and the domestic political conditions of the 2002 elections the preference 
ordering is assumed to be the following and it will be rated accordingly when 
building the decision matrix: 
Preference ordering in domestic politics dimension: A2 > A1 > A3 > A4 
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ii. (D2) Military/strategic Dimension: 
 
In this section, foreign policy alternatives will be ordered based on their 
military and strategic implications. The military implications of a foreign policy 
orientation will be identified based on the inherent ‘risk of conflict’. When 
deciding on the utility of a foreign policy orientation in the military dimension 
the basic aim of the policy-maker will be to avoid ‘military costs’. Costs are 
defined as loss in logistics, capacity and human life which are generally 
associated with cases of war and/or kinds of military conflict. Those policy 
orientations that have greater possibility to lead Turkey into military conflict 
will be assumed to be more costly; hence, their utility will be less than others.  
Additionally, strategic implications of a foreign policy orientation could 
be decided based on their likelihood to result in the “Grand Strategy” 
formulized by the policy-makers. “Grand Strategy” refers to what Gray (2007: 
283) defines as the “purposeful employment of all instruments of power 
available to a security community”. The achievement of a “Grand Strategy” 
then, requires the mobilization of all available resources towards the 
achievement of a certain political goal. It is a broad term that “embraces all 
the instruments of statecraft, including the military” (Gray 2007: 1).  
 In the case of Turkey, Davutoğlu and Gül both refer to Turkey’s 
“Strategic Depth” and its aim to increase its prestige and credibility in the 
surrounding geographies. This is followed by the need to have an independent 
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standing in the conduct of foreign policy. In addition, they have occasionally 
referred to Turkey’s “peaceful”, “problem-solving”, “stability-providing” role 
as part of the foreign policy vision at their mind. So the grand strategy was to 
achieve a central regional power status for Turkey that could follow an 
independent, credible and peaceful foreign policy.  
According to AKP foreign policy makers then, a foreign policy alternative 
would be in the higher end of the military/strategic preference ordering based 
on two considerations. 1. Is Ax expected to result in a more peaceful and less 
conflictual foreign policy-environment for Turkey? 2. Is Ax expected to provide 
a central power status for Turkey that could follow an independent foreign 
policy? 
 SQ foreign policy orientation (A1) was the most confrontational one 
among others. A heavy emphasis on the protection of national borders and 
security against threats brought the country on the verge of conflict several 
times throughout the 1990s. In addition to its military implications the SQ 
foreign policy also had negative implications for the Grand strategy. As stated 
above, since Turkey’s active engagement with the regional countries was 
regarded as a ‘reactive derivative’ of Turkey’s relations with the west, it, on 
the one hand, decreased Turkey’s credibility in the Muslim world; on the 
other hand, did not have the desired impact over the West. The SQ foreign 
policy worked against Turkey’s desire to achieve a central power status in the 
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region. Then, (A1) SQ Foreign policy orientation will be regarded as the one 
that is expected to provide the least utility in the military/strategic dimension. 
 The other three foreign policy alternatives resulted in a positive 
answer to the first question. A2, A3 and A4 did not have a confrontational 
stance in foreign policy. They were aimed at improving the country’s 
credibility in its surrounding regions. However, a preference ordering could 
still be made with regard to the answer of second question. The grand 
strategy in AKP leader’s mind was to have peaceful relations with the regional 
countries, improve the country’s prestige through the achievement of a 
central regional power status. This would also lead the country to achieve a 
more independent stance in its conduct of foreign policy. When evaluation is 
based on the answer on the second question A3 (NFP-B) is assumed to provide 
the greatest utility since it was the one that fit most to the grand strategy. 
NFP-B aimed at achieving a regional power status independent of an emphasis 
on EU membership. As Davutoğlu mentions “Turkey cannot wait forever at 
the EU door and needs to develop a genuinely multidirectional foreign policy 
by utilizing its geostrategic advantages” (quoted in Murinson, 2006: 952).   
 In the preference ordering A3 (NFP-B) was followed by A2 (NFP-A) since 
it also aimed at improving Turkey’s regional credibility. However A2 also 
included an emphasis on EU membership which reduced the probability of 
becoming an independent central regional power. A4, although it was not 
confrontational, it was a reactionary foreign policy aimed at complete break 
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with the West and an orientation towards Muslim countries. So, whereas it 
included an aim to improve Turkey’s relations with the regional countries, it 
sacrificed Turkey’s long-term strategic relationship with the Western 
countries. 
To put it more specifically, A1 did neither fit AKP’s military 
considerations nor its grand strategy so it is assumed to provide the least 
utility. A4 was not confrontational but it risked Turkey’s strategic position and 
its long-term relationship with the West. So A4 is assumed to have less utility 
than A2 and A3. A2 (NFP-A), although resulted positive in both military 
considerations and in grand strategy, it provided less utility then A3 (NFP-B) in 
achieving an independent stance in the conduct of Foreign policy. So the 
preference ordering is assumed to be the following: 
Preference ordering in military/strategic dimension: A3> A2 > A4 > A1 
 
 
iii. (D3) Economic Dimension: 
 
This section aims to underline the preference ordering of AKP leaders based 
on the economic implications of policy alternatives. At this point, it is 
important to stress that the economic dimension does not include the 
domestic level economic variables since they were included in the domestic 
politics dimension. By economic dimension, the thesis refers to the 
international economic implications of the alternatives. So it refers to Turkey’s 
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international economic considerations such as increasing trade, finding new 
export markets, attracting FDI (Foreign Direct Investment), diversifying energy 
routes, and increasing tourist inflows. 
 The literature on TFP remains limited in explaining TFP with reference 
to economic factors. In fact the economic dimension is not studied as one of 
the major determinants of TFP in the post-Cold War era. However the thesis 
argues that economic dimension is also an important factor that affected the 
foreign policy considerations of AKP leaders. Although it is not elaborated in a 
detailed manner by Davutoğlu, the economic dimension received 
considerable attention. For instance, Davutoğlu stresses the geo-economic 
importance of the Middle East and Eurasia as important regions for economic 
resources (petroleum and gas) of the world (Davutoğlu 2010: 497-499). 
Improving economic relations with the surrounding regions is proposed as an 
outcome of Turkey’s dynamic and active foreign policy. Most of the 
institutions proposed as tools for Turkey’s active engagement in the region 
are economic cooperation initiatives. Efficient use of institutions including 
ICO, BSEC, ECO, and G-20 would eventually lead to further economic 
cooperation. Indeed, Davutoğlu regards the task of improving economic and 
political interdependency in the region as a means to increase Turkey’s 
“prestige and credibility” so that it becomes a central regional power. A 
similar understanding is also visible in Erdoğan’s speeches. 
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 Beside AKP leaders’ expressions there were also some facts defining 
Turkey’s economic interests in the period. Especially in its trade relations, EU 
countries constituted the main destination of Turkey’s imports and exports in 
the period. For instance, the EU-25 constituted approximately 57 percent of 
Turkey’s total exports and 50 percent of the total imports in 2003. On the 
other hand, the Middle East constituted only 6, 5 percent of the total export 
and 11, 5 of the total imports (Turkish Statistical Institute-TSI, 2011). So when 
the economic dimension of a policy alternative is considered it is reasonable 
to assume that the policy-makers will seriously take this approximate 50 
percent dependency into account. So any policy alternative that includes an 
anti-EU stance could be expected to provide the less utility in the economic 
dimension.  
 For a country aiming at an independent and multi-dimensional foreign 
policy a 50% economic dependency constitutes a significant handicap. In fact 
when the trade statistics of the following years is analyzed one might see a 
pattern that leads to diversify Turkey’s trade dependency. The statistics in the 
tables below show that Turkish policy-makers attempted to overcome the EU 
dependency by gradually increasing Turkey’s import and export with the 
countries in the “near land, sea and continent basins”.  
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Table 4.1 - Import Destinations of Turkey by Regions (%) 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
EU (27) 46,5 42,1 42.7 29.2 37.2 40.1 
Other Europe 18.9 20.4 18.5 42.6 22.0 18.6 
Near and Middle East 5.7 6.8 7.6 5.4 8.8 6.8 
Other Asia 15.9 17.6 18.4 14.3 18.9 20.5 
North America 5.2 5.0 5.0 3.8 2.6 6.8 
Central America and 
the Caribbean 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 
South America 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.1 1.6 1.6 
North Africa 3.3 3.6 3.5 1.5 6.7 2.5 
Other Africa 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.3 1.2 1.5 
Other Countries 0,6 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.6 
Free Zones in Turkey 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.7 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Table 4.2 - Export Destinations of Turkey by Regions (%) 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
EU (27) 54,5 52,3 56.0 56.2 48.2 46 
Other Europe 10.5 12.0 9.3 10.1 11.9 11.1 
Near and Middle East 12.5 13.9 13.3 14 19.3 18.8 
Other Asia 4.0 4.1 4.6 5.0 5.4 6.6 
North America 8.3 7.2 6.4 4.2 3.6 3.5 
Central America and 
the Caribbean 
0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 
South America 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.7 
North Africa 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.2 2.4 7.3 
Other Africa 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.4 2.6 
Other Countries 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.1 0.9 
Free Zones in Turkey 4.1 3.9 3.4 2.7 2.3 1.9 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TIS- Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, 2011; the 
Foreign Economic Relations Council (FERC- Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Konseyi) 
 
According to the latest data provided by TSI the EU-27 constitutes 48 percent 
of the total exports and only 38 percent of the total imports (see Turkish 
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Statistical Institute 2011a; 2011b). The tables also show that there has been a 
tendency to overcome trade dependency on the EU which will lead to a more 
economically independent foreign policy.  
The policy makers expected to develop economic cooperation with the 
countries in the surrounding regions without seriously harming the countries 
relationship with the EU. Since the country was more than 50 percent 
dependent on the EU in its trade then a policy alternative that damages 
Turkey-EU relations would be expected to be in the lower end of the 
economic preference ordering. The 50% dependency is quite high for a 
country aiming at an independent and multi-dimensional foreign policy 
orientation. This situation put Turkey in an important dilemma at the period. 
On the one hand, the policy makers wanted Turkey to achieve a more 
independent foreign policy orientation and a central role in the region on the 
other hand the country was economically dependent on the EU which puts a 
significant handicap on the grand strategy. Then, a foreign policy alternative 
would be in the higher or lower end of the economic preference ordering 
based on the following considerations. 1. Is Ax expected to result in a non-
conflictual relationship with the EU? 2. Is Ax expected to result in a more 
independent international economic position to Turkey? 
 The answer of the first question puts A4 (NVP) in the lowest end of the 
preference ordering in the economic dimension. Following an anti-EU foreign 
policy would seriously harm Turkey-EU economic relations. Other three 
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foreign policy alternatives survive from the first question since none of them 
were against the EU. However these alternatives could still be ordered with 
regard to the answer of the second question. 
Decreasing Turkey’s economic dependence on EU would necessitate 
diversifying trade routes. The diversification of trade routes requires either 
entering into new economic cooperation agreements or using the existing 
cooperation initiatives more efficiently. AKP foreign policy-makers’ emphasis 
on active engagement in Turkey’s surrounding regions served this strategy in 
at least two ways. Improving relations with the near land, sea and continent 
basins would on the one hand decrease Turkey’s economic dependency on 
the EU-27 on the other hand improve the country’s trade income since the 
existing trade rates would be increased.   A1 (SQ) was a Western-oriented 
foreign policy but the confrontational stance limited Turkey’s positive 
engagements with its surrounding regions. Although it was not an anti-EU 
foreign policy orientation it would remain insufficient to increase Turkey’s 
economic cooperation in the region. A2 was both emphasizing Turkey’s EU 
membership and peaceful stance in the region.  
In fact, in a period of economic crisis, the EU led reform process was 
expected to serve as a stability provider. The improvement of Turkey-EU 
relations increased FDI inflows towards the country. Besides, having peaceful 
and positive relations with the countries in the region increased the likelihood 
of economic cooperation with the neighboring countries. A3 did emphasize 
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neither EU nor the countries in the surrounding regions. It aimed at having an 
independent status in the region leading to a central power status for Turkey. 
Having a central regional power status without any international dependency 
can be assumed to provide the greatest utility in the economic dimension. 
However, given the existing situation in 2003- Turkey’s economic dependency 
on the EU and the stability providing impact of EU led reform process- It is 
assumed to provide less utility than A2. So the preference ordering is assumed 
to be the following: 
Preference ordering in economic dimension: A2> A3 > A1 > A4 
 
 
iv. (D4) Cultural/ideational Dimension: 
 
The PH theory has generally been applied to single decisions and the cultural 
and ideational determinants of foreign policy alternatives did not took part in 
these applications. Scholars have generally focused on the military, strategic 
or economic aspects of foreign policies while disregarding the cultural ones. 
However, there is also space to integrate cultural and/or ideational factors 
since the PH theory claims that the utility dimensions of foreign policy 
alternatives can vary according to the analyzed foreign policy decision at 
hand. The thesis argues that any analysis of the 59th Government’s foreign 
policy orientation cannot ignore the impact of the leaders’ cultural/ideational 
calculations. By including the cultural/ideational dimension in its analysis, the 
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thesis tries to understand the use of AKP foreign policy makers’ expressions 
including the historical and/or cultural ties between Turkey and its immediate 
neighborhood: Turkey’s role as a bridge between civilizations; Turkey as the 
crossroad of different cultures; Turkey’s Ottoman past; and the role of Islam 
in Turkey’s international relations. In fact, many references were made to 
these kinds of ideational constructions throughout the post-Cold War era. 
Especially Davutoğlu, Gül and Erdoğan made specific references to 
these ideational roles of Turkey and the country’s responsibilities resulting 
from them. As it is also mentioned above Davutoğlu puts Turkey both 
geographically and historically in the center of the world (Davutoğlu 2010: 
552-553). Turkey is argued to have unique cultural/ideational assets since it 
has historically been a part of a political entity that endured for centuries as a 
civilizational center and the crossroad of the world (the Ottoman Empire) 
(Davutoğlu, 2010: 81). That is why some scholars explained the new foreign 
policy orientation as a variant of the “Neo-Ottomanism” debate (see 
Murinson 2006; Yanık 2011 for a detailed overview). Neo-Ottomanism can be 
defined as “a discourse *or strategy] that highlights Turkey’s Ottoman past 
and mixes it with geographical uniqueness to justify an active foreign policy in 
Turkey’s immediate neighborhood” (Yanık 2011: 81). This strategy, however, 
is not unique to AKP’s foreign policy since many references were made to the 
historical roots of the republic throughout the post-Cold War era (Yanık 2011: 
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81).  By referring to Turkey’s Ottoman past, AKP leaders attempted to justify 
their foreign policy activism in the period. 
In addition to referring to Turkey’s Ottoman past, AKP leaders also 
used the famous “bridge metaphor”. For instance Gül (2007:35-42) states that 
Turkey has “a historic opportunity to reconnect Europe and Asia through the 
bridge of the Euro-Asian landmass, transforming the term Euro-Asia into a 
political and economic reality” (Gül 2007: 43). This opportunity would lead 
Turkey to engage in new trade and economic cooperation initiatives and 
achieve a “pivotal role” and a “central power” status in the region (Gül 2007: 
43-46). He claims that Turkey has the capacity to increase regional 
cooperation for trade, security and political development by using its 
historical and cultural background as an asset. Turkey, according to Gül, is 
attaining a role “to promote peace, stability and development” in its 
neighborhood (Gül, 2007: 44) and it has “deep historical and cultural ties with 
the states and people of this vast region *Eurasia+” (Gül 2007: 47).  
The bridge metaphor has also been used for a long time in TFP. As 
Yanık (2006: 534) points out, throughout the 1990s, Turkish foreign policy 
makers “portrayed Turkey as a country having a hybrid identity…with each 
foot in different continent…both belonging equally to different civilizations, 
Western and Eastern at the same time…” (emphasis added). However, 
starting with the AKP period this portrayal has changed. “Though some of 
these hybrid features of Turkey such as being in the two continents, etc., were 
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kept, religion was introduced into the discourse”(Yanık 2006: 534). The bridge 
discourse in the 1990s generally referred to Turkey’s role as mediating the 
relations between the countries in the East and the west. Starting with the 
AKP period it turned towards a role to bridge the Western civilization and the 
Eastern (Muslim) civilization (Yanık 2006: 538-539). Thus,” the meaning of the 
‘bridge’ metaphor changed from one of mediator/stabilizer/facilitator to a 
spokesperson *for Islam+” (Yanık, 2006: 534). “The alliance of Civilizations” 
project initiated in 2004 under UN auspices by Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan 
and his Spanish counterpart Zapatero is one of the most concrete examples of 
this change.  
The cultural/ideational references to Turkey’s Ottoman heritage and 
its role as a “bridge between civilizations” were used to justify and/or 
legitimize the new foreign policy activism in the AKP period. AKP leaders 
portrayed Turkey as a role model for Muslim countries and a link to the West. 
Gül significantly states that Turkey has a mission to accomplish: “to prove that 
a Muslim society is capable of changing and renovating itself, attaining 
contemporary standards, while preserving its values, tradition and identity” 
(Gül, 2007: 37). He refers to the existing prejudices in the West about Islam 
that were “misled by those who claim to act in the name of Islam and resort 
to violence” and that these “misunderstandings and prejudices can be 
minimized by individuals and states that cultivate cross-cultural skills” (Gül 
2007: 42). In fact, these arguments, in addition to legitimizing Turkey’s active 
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engagement in its immediate neighborhood, are altogether used as a strategy 
by AKP policy makers’ to promote Turkey’s EU accession process. The above 
mentioned “bow and arrow” metaphor (see chapter 3) clarifies this strategy. 
According to Davutoğlu (2010: 551-563) Turkey represents the arrow which is 
directed at Europe, and its foreign policy environment represents the bow.  
The more Turkey strains the bow towards the Caucasus and the Middle East 
the faster it enters into the European Union. This strategy is assumed to be an 
important determinant of the evaluation rule in the cultural/ideational 
dimension of the model. 
The preference ordering in the cultural/ideational dimension will be 
made according to a number of considerations. For AKP leaders, a foreign 
policy alternative would be expected to facilitate the use of Turkey’s 
cultural/ideational assets first as a means to promote the EU accession 
process and second as a means to increase Turkey’s central power status 
making Turkey a role model for the countries in its surrounding regions. 
Foreign policy alternatives that fail to adopt one of these considerations 
would be assumed to be at the lower end of the preference ordering. 
Security-oriented foreign policies would lead to the application of hard 
power measures which would be in contrast with the idea of increasing 
credibility and prestige in Turkey’s neighborhood. The use of 
cultural/ideational assets in AKP leaders’ mind was expected to increase the 
country’s soft power that is “the power of attraction” in the region (See 
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Oğuzlu 2007). Since Turkey was portrayed as a role model in the region, 
emphasis on soft power, diplomacy and cultural/historical linkages is assumed 
to be more preferable than an emphasis on hard power and security. Thus, we 
assume that the confrontational nature of the SQ policy put it in the lowest 
end of the preference ordering in the Cultural/ideational dimension. 
Although the foreign policy orientation of AKP took Islam as one of 
Turkey’s cultural/ideational assets, TFP in the AKP period is not regarded as an 
Islamist foreign policy orientation (see Kirişçi 2009: 35-36). The period was 
dominated by the international developments such as the 9/11 attacks, the 
clash of civilizations thesis, increasing anti-Islam in the west and anti-
Americanism in the East. In that period, AKP leaders portrayed Turkey in 
Yanık’s (2006) terms as the “spokesperson of Islam”. On the one hand the aim 
was to increase Turkey’s credibility, prestige and the soft power in the region. 
On the other hand references to Turkey’s Islamic values were altogether used 
as strategy to increase the likelihood of Turkey’s accession to the EU. This puts 
the NVP at the lowest end of the preference ordering in the 
Cultural/Ideational dimension. Although it argues for the use of Turkey’s 
Islamic assets, the NVP was against Turkey’s membership to the EU. This anti-
EU tendency of the NVP was in contrast with AKP leaders’ “Turkey as an inter-
civilizational bridge” strategy. Additionally AKP leaders did not refer to the use 
of Islamic values to establish a “Commonwealth of Islamic States” as it was 
supported by NVP.  
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 A2 (NFP-A) and A3 (NFP-B) were both soft power oriented foreign 
policies. The main difference stems from NFP-A’s emphasis on Turkey’s EU 
membership process. That is to say, whereas NFP-A aimed at facilitating 
Turkey’s EU accession process, NFP-B aimed at achieving a central power 
status for Turkey in the region without specifically emphasizing any direction. 
Both policies necessitate the use of cultural/ideational assets of Turkey as a 
means to achieve the aim. NFP-B was not against Turkey’s EU membership 
but it contained the use of cultural ideational factors to increase Turkey’s soft 
power and independent status in the conduct of foreign policy. On the other 
hand NFP-A directly aimed at using Turkey’s cultural/ideational assets as a 
means to promote Turkey-EU relationship. Thus NFP-A will be assumed to 
provide greater utility than NFP-B in the Cultural/ideational dimension. Thus 
the preference ordering becomes the following:  
Preference ordering in Cultural/Ideational Dimension: A2> A3 > A4 > A1 
 
 
4.1.3. Ratings and the Decision Matrix: 
 
The previous section explained the implications of each foreign policy 
alternative on different dimensions and put the policy alternatives put into a 
preference ordering based on the evaluation criteria at each dimension. Those 
policies that are expected to provide the greatest utility are put in the higher 
end of the preference ordering. The preference ordering is assumed to be A2 > 
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A1 > A3 > A4 in domestic politics dimension, A3 > A2 > A4 > A1 in 
military/strategic dimension, A2 > A3 > A1 > A4 in economic dimension and A2 > 
A3 > A4 > A1 in the cultural ideational dimension. This section will rate (give 
scores to) each alternative in line with the preference orderings that were 
identified above. Then the decision matrix will be constructed and the total 
average scores of these four alternatives will be calculated.  
Table 4.3 gives a summary of the PH Decision-making Model on TFP in 
AKP period. The first column summarizes the foreign policy alternatives the 
second column lists the utility dimensions and the third column shows the 
rating of each alternative at each dimension. Those policies that are at the 
highest end of the preference ordering will be assumed to have “4 units” of 
utility and those that are at the lowest end have “1 unit” of utility. According 
to the preference ordering in the domestic politics dimension (D1), NFP-A (A2) 
stands at the highest end of the preference ordering (A2 > A1 > A3 > A4) making 
it the most preferable foreign policy alternative based on the evaluation 
criteria in D1. A2 was followed by A1 (SQ), A3 (NFP-B) and A4 (NVP). Thus, they 
receive the following scores: A2=4; A1=3; A3=2; and A4=1. Other policies are 
also rated with the same logic and the decision matrix is constructed 
accordingly (see Table 4.). 
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Table 4.4. - The Decision Matrix of AKP Leaders in 2003 
Foreign Policy 
Alternatives 
Dimensions Total 
Utility 
Score 
(Average) Political 
(D1) 
Military/ 
Strategic 
(D2) 
Economic 
(D3) 
Cultural/ 
Ideational 
(D4) 
Follow the SQ 
 (A1) 3 1 2 1 
7 
(1.75) 
New Foreign 
Policy- A 
(A2) 
4 3 4 4 
15 
(3,75) 
New Foreign 
Policy- B 
(A3) 
2 4 3 3 
12 
(3) 
Follow the 
National 
Vision Foreign 
Policy 
(A4) 
1 2 1 2 
6 
(1,5) 
 
4.2. Discussion: 
 
The previous part put the foreign policy alternatives in a preference ordering 
according to their domestic politics, military/strategic, economic, and cultural 
ideational implications in 2003. This section while analyzing AKP’s decision to 
follow a new foreign policy orientation aims to answer the above mentioned 
three questions: Given the Islamic roots and the anti-EU stance of AKP’s 
political background (the Nationalist View tradition) why did the government 
follow an enthusiastic EU direction after assuming the government in 2002? 
Why did AKP leaders decide to diverge from the SQ foreign policy of the 1990s 
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by leaving the confrontational and military/security based orientation towards 
a more “soft power” oriented one? Why did the AKP government shift the 
foreign policy axis of the country by leaving the heavy emphasis on EU after 
starting the accession negotiations in 2005? 
As we have explained in chapter 2, the PH theory assumes that 
domestic politics is the essence of decision. Accordingly, while analyzing 
foreign policy decisions PH analysts identify the decision rule of the leaders in 
domestic politics and accordingly eliminate some of the alternatives in the 
first stage. As we have identified in the first part, the decision rule of AKP 
leaders is the following: “to achieve legitimacy and political survival in an 
environment hostile to fundamentalist political Islam.” In fact this rule gives 
the answer of the first question (why did AKP leave A4?). Policy alternatives 
that fail to satisfy the decision rule are rejected at the first stage of the 
decision-making process. Although AKP came from a fundamentalist political 
Islam background, the leaders of the party were quick to distance themselves 
from the NV tradition. They defined AKP as a “conservative democratic party” 
and regarded the EU direction as a protective shield for their actions. 
Following the NV tradition would be in direct contrast with their domestic 
politics considerations.  
Indeed, an analyst following AKP’s election campaign would not expect 
to see a NV orientation in their foreign policy conduct.  The ideational 
references to Islam did not aim at building an “Islamic union” against the 
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West. Those references aimed at strengthening Turkey’s stance vis-à-vis the 
EU accession process as they put Turkey as an inter-civilizational bridge that 
could improve the EU’s ideational role in the international system. A4 achieved 
the lowest score (1.5) in the decision matrix of AKP at that period (see table 
4.4). It was the least preferable option for the leaders at that time and as the 
PH theory assumes NVP was eliminated in the first stage of the decision-
making process since it did not satisfy the decision rule. 
Since 2002, AKP foreign policy makers have continuously referred to 
the need to improve Turkey’s role in the region. They argued that Turkey 
should actively participate in regional cooperation initiatives including IGOs, 
bilateral and multilateral agreement, and regional peace-building initiatives. 
This aim required soft power (economic, ideational, diplomatic power of 
attraction) oriented measures instead of confrontational or military oriented 
ones. This clarifies the answer of the second question (why leave the SQ-A1?). 
As we have stated above (section 4.1) AKP leaders regarded the previous TFP 
as “problem-driven”, “defense oriented”, and “reactive” whereas they have 
argued that the Turkey’s new policy foreign should be “pro-active”, “soft-
power oriented”, and “problem-solving”. According to the decision matrix 
(Table 4.4) the SQ policy scored 1.75 which is less than both new foreign 
policy orientation alternatives (NFP-A and NFP-B). Following one of those 
policies was more in line with AKP leaders’ foreign policy vision. 
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A2 achieved the highest score (3.5) making it a more profitable foreign 
policy orientation than the others. Under the conditions of 2003, A2 stands as 
the best alternative among others. However, foreign policies change since 
they are not ahistorical and conditions are not static. It is generally argued in 
the literature that AKP leaders have changed their foreign policy orientation 
from what this thesis conceptualized as NFP-A to NFP-B. This argument brings 
us to the answer of the third question (why shift from A2 to A3 after 2005?). 
Starting with the formal opening of the EU-Turkey accession negotiations in 
2005, scholars have argued that Turkey has lost its enthusiasm for 
membership for a number of reasons. We believe that the PH model might 
capture these conditions and explain this change.  
In the domestic politics dimension we have analyzed a number of 
conditions. First, we referred to a domestic environment hostile to political 
Islam and AKP’s need to prove itself as a new political movement distant from 
the NV tradition. Accordingly, “achieving legitimacy” has become the primary 
aim of AKP leaders in that period. Second, we referred to the EU as a 
“legitimacy providing actor” for the domestic political activities of AKP. 
Throughout the period between 2002 elections until 2007 AKP made a 
number of reforms in accordance with the EU accession criteria(such as 
limiting the role of the military) while entering into 3 elections and gradually 
increasing its share in the total votes (from .. to..). Thus, AKP leaders’ 
dependency on a legitimacy providing actor (such as the EU) decreased. 
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Although keeping distance with NV tradition remained as part of the decision 
rule, by 2007 elections no one would argue that AKP was following policies in 
line with the NV tradition. Increasing criticisms against Turkey’s possible EU 
membership coming from major EU countries like Germany and France 
together with a “privileged partnership” proposal instead of “full-
membership” resulted in a significant decrease in Turkish public support for 
EU (from around 70% to 40%). Increasing domestic criticism against EU might 
have served as catalyst of the loss of EU enthusiasm in AKP leaders’ vision 
through changing the preference ordering in domestic politics dimension. The 
previous preference ordering took EU as a major determinant of foreign policy 
alternatives. Those alternatives lacking an EU emphasis were assumed to 
provide less utility. However, by 2005 the EU emphasis was not a focal point 
of AKP leaders’ foreign policy vision; hence, the domestic politics preference 
ordering changed from A2 > A1 > A3 > A4 to A3> A2 > A1 > A4. Limiting the 
impact of Turkey’s EU membership perspective in AKP leader’s foreign policy 
vision also changes the preference ordering in other dimensions, putting A3 in 
the higher end.  
From our analysis of AKP leaders’ speeches we understood that their 
“grand strategy” was to achieve a central regional power status for Turkey 
that could follow an independent, credible and peaceful foreign policy. 
However, given the domestic political and economic conditions of the period 
(2003) we assumed that A2 provided greater utility than A3. However there is 
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a pattern in AKP leaders’ conduct of foreign policy towards achieving a more 
independent role for Turkey in its region. Thus, the shift from A2 to A3 that has 
already started in 2005 is expected to continue in the current period if the 
criticisms in the EU front do not decrease or if the EU does not provide a more 
concrete membership perspective to Turkey. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The thesis argues that understanding the dynamics behind Turkey’s post- Cold 
War foreign policy is a challenging task to accomplish because of two main 
reasons. First, Turkey’s foreign policy orientations display changing patterns 
and trends depending on the ideological and political profiles of the ruling 
elite. Second, most of the major international events and structural changes 
of the Post-Cold War era (including the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the two Gulf 
wars, the Arab-Israeli conflicts, and the rising tensions between Islam and the 
West) occurred in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood; making it difficult for 
Turkey to adopt a unidirectional approach to foreign policy. With an aim to 
explain these changing patterns and directions of TFP in the post-Cold War era 
the thesis asks two questions: one methodological and one empirical. The 
methodological question aims to provide a formal model with a holistic 
approach that could integrate multi-level and multi-dimensional variables in 
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its analysis. It is argued that applying the PH decision-making theory is a useful 
way to accomplish this task.  
The empirical question aims at explaining the major factors that 
determined the foreign policy orientation and re-orientation of Turkey in the 
AKP period. In the literature, Turkey’s post-Cold War foreign policy is generally 
studied in three periods: the period before AKP (the 1990s), the first period of 
AKP government with a significant EU membership direction (2002-2005) and 
the second period of AKP government with an emphasis on independent 
regional activism (the period after 2005). The AKP period foreign policy 
orientation is both converging with and diverging from that of the previous 
period. Although both policy orientations included a significant EU direction, 
TFP in the 1990s is defined as ‘military/security oriented’ and ‘confrontational’ 
whereas TFP in the AKP period is defined as ‘soft power oriented’ and 
‘peaceful’. After 2005, when EU formally opened accession negotiations with 
Turkey, a declining enthusiasm is observed in AKP’s foreign policy orientation. 
The thesis argues that, among others, the prospect of EU membership; the 
impact of Davutoğlu and his arguments on Turkey’s “strategic depth”; the 
domestic political conditions of the period; and the political background of 
AKP have been the major determinants of these shifting foreign policy 
orientations. 
While analyzing AKP leaders’ decision to choose a new foreign policy 
orientation instead of other alternatives, the thesis uses two sources of 
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information: First, the TFP literature is explained in chapter 3 and then AKP 
leaders’ speeches are analyzed and their foreign policy vision is summarized in 
chapter 4. The PH decision matrix is constructed upon the information given 
in the literature about the major determinants of TFP. The literature is 
organized in line with AKP leaders’ foreign policy vision. Accordingly, the 
thesis identifies four different foreign policy alternatives (SQ, NFP-A, NFP-B 
and NVP), evaluates the expected utility of these alternatives across different 
dimensions (political, military/strategic, economic and cultural/ideational), 
puts these alternatives into a preference ordering, rates them and explains 
the reasons behind AKP leaders’ decision to follow an active foreign policy 
orientation instead of others. Given the information available in the literature 
and with reference to AKP leaders’ foreign policy vision these alternatives and 
utility dimensions stand as a good representation of the choice set that could 
have been constructed at the period. 
PH theory applies a two-staged decision analysis. While doing so, it 
uses both ‘cognitive’ and ‘rational’ approaches of FPA. Cognitive factors play a 
role in the first stage. It is argued that decision-makers have ‘decision rules’ in 
their mind which serve as ‘cognitive shortcuts’ to simplify the decision-making 
environment. When faced with a number of alternatives, the decision-maker 
eliminates the ones that do not satisfy the ‘decision rule’. Thus, some of the 
alternatives are eliminated at the first stage before the foreign policy maker 
enters into rational utility calculations. For instance, as this thesis argues, AKP 
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leaders’ decision rule in 2003 was to ‘achieve legitimacy and political survival 
in an environment hostile to fundamentalist political Islam’. Thus, NVP was 
eliminated at the first stage of decision-making since it did not satisfy the 
decision rule. The second stage of foreign policy-making involves rational 
calculations. Each foreign policy alternative generates gains and costs. The 
leaders are assumed to have subjective estimations about the utility of each 
alternative. According to the possible gains and costs of these alternatives, 
leaders’ attribute utilities to them and choose the ones that are expected to 
provide the greatest utility. So policy alternatives that survive the first 
‘cognitive stage’ of decision-making are evaluated in the second ‘rational 
stage’ according to these expected utility calculations. While analyzing AKP 
leaders’ decision in 2003, the thesis evaluated the implications of the foreign 
policy alternatives across dimensions and put each foreign policy alternative 
in a preference ordering. Those policy alternatives that are expected to 
provide the greatest utility are put in the highest end of the preference 
ordering and scored accordingly. Finally, as NFP-A got the highest score in the 
decision matrix it is assumed to be the best decision at that period. 
Applying the PH theory provides the policy analyst a holistic 
framework that could integrate multi-level and multi-dimensional variables in 
an organized manner. However the model has limitations. Since it builds a 
formal model, which is a ‘representative abstraction’ of reality, it necessitates 
the analyst to work with idealized representations. For instance, while 
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building the model with reference to the literature and AKP leaders’ foreign 
policy vision we assumed that there were four foreign policy orientation 
alternatives and analyzed these alternatives across four dimensions.  
However, it is important to mention that the list of alternatives is non-
exhaustive. One might add more policy alternatives and dimensions by 
conceptualizing them differently. On the other hand, we assumed that the 
utility dimensions are mutually exclusive. However it is not possible to exclude 
political from the economic or strategic considerations of policy makers in 
reality. We accept that all these dimensions work in an interrelated manner in 
real life. We believe that the model constructed in this thesis is a useful 
representation of the decision-making process in 2003. It is useful for at least 
two reasons. First, the literature on TFP includes a great number of empirical 
studies referring to many aspects of TFP including a complex set of variables 
in a disorganized way. Since most of the studies remain empirical and 
descriptive, building a formal model is proposed as a useful way to 
understand and explain shifting TFP orientations within an ‘organized’ and 
‘structured’ framework. New variables that are introduced to the literature by 
empirical studies can be integrated in one of the dimensions proposed by the 
PH model. Second, the model proposed by the PH theory is falsifiable. The 
arguments and concepts are expected to be defined, stated, and justified 
clearly. The thesis attempted to construct its model in line with these 
considerations. 
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